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I. INTRODUCTION

Recent heated debates over Neo-Nazi demonstrations have brought
Germany's perhaps most socially and politically sensitive topic to the
forefront of an intensive dialogue over the limits of free speech and
assembly. The underlying question is how much freedom of speech can
right-wing extremist and Neo-Nazi groups in Germany claim today? The
Federal Constitutional Court and the State Administrative Court of North
Rhine-Westphalia are engaged in a particularly memorable dispute, with
the state court refusing to follow the Federal Constitutional Court's
standard. This dispute among the two courts is highly instructive as it
highlights the arguments on both sides of the debate in an exemplary
fashion.
The Federal Constitutional Court, described as the "guardian of
German democracy,"' has a central role in defining what constitutes
permissible public discourse and has, over the years, been trying to find a
workable balance between freedom of speech and the protection of
countervailing constitutional interests. The relatively more speechprotective stance of the Federal Constitutional Court, which may still
appear highly restrictive from a U.S. perspective,2 has led to decisions
overruling bans of right-wing extremist and Neo-Nazi demonstrations.
This, needless to say, struck a nerve with the German public that, joined
by leading politicians, reacted with considerable outrage to Neo-Nazi and
right-wing extremist groups using the symbolism and imagery of historic
locations like the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin.'
Those opposed to the ideas propagated at these events, the vast
majority of the German public, consequently, fall into two groups. Some,
1. Donald P. Kommers, The Federal Constitutional Court: Guardian of German
Democracy, 603 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & SOC. Sl.111, 111 (2006).
2. Infra Part V.B.1
3. Hilmar Sander, Wiederkehrthema:Die 6ffentliche Ordnung-dasverkannteSchutzgut?
[Returning Topic: Public Order-The Underestimated Subject of Protection?], 21 NEUE
ZEITSCHRIF FUR VERWALTUNGSRECHT [NVwZ] 831, 831-34 (2002).
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taking a cue from the Federal Constitutional Court, argue that the best way
to fight objectionable ideas is to let them be articulated in an open "battle
of opinions'" where these ideas can be met with strongly articulated
opposition. From a U.S. perspective, this struggle between speech and
counterspeech5 should sound familiar. The Federal Constitutional Court's
approach, however, departs somewhat from the U.S. approach, as this
Article will show, because speech that falls within the scope of certain
provisions of the German Criminal Code is prohibited.
Others, taking a cue from the state administrative court, argue that
right-wing extremist and Neo-Nazi ideas should be banned from public
discourse altogether. "Nip it in the bud" perhaps best sums up the
sentiment articulated by the state administrative court.6 According to this
approach, the fact that a majority of the public would find the ideas
disseminated at right-wing and Neo-Nazi demonstrations objectionable
should be sufficient to prohibit the demonstrations, even if the ideas
propagated at these demonstrations do not run afoul of the Criminal Code.
The disagreement about the level of free speech protections illustrates
Germany's ongoing struggle with its past. It further highlights important
aspects of basic constitutional doctrine in the area of free speech and
assembly, reflecting the struggle between permissiveness and faith in the
"good" opinions on the one hand, and weariness and distrust ofjudgment
on the other. This Article seeks to place both the clash of the courts and
related recent legislative activities in the area in a larger societal context
by asking whether it is desirable in a liberal democracy in general, and in
Germany in particular, to prohibit extremists' assemblies and speech.

4. See, e.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 25,
1961, 12 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 113, 125 (F.R.G.)
[hereinafter: Schmid-Spiegel decision]; Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal
Constitutional Court] Jan. 15, 1958, 7 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfUE]
198, 208 (F.R.G) [hereinafter: Luth decision].
5. See, e.g., Schmid-Spiegel decision, supra note 4, at 125.
6. See also Winfried Brugger, The TreatmentofHateSpeech in German ConstitutionalLaw,
4 GERMAN L.J. 42, 81 (2003), originally published in STOCKTAKING INGERMAN PUBLc LAW 117
(Bullinger & Starck eds., 2002), availableat www.germanlawjoumal.com/article.php?id=225.
Common rallying cries in Germany are "Nip it in the bud" (WehretdenAnfidngen)
and "Never Again" (Nie wieder). These slogans were initially directed only
against a recurrence of the Nazi regime of terror but are now used to condemn
hate speech writ large. Although no person of good will could dispute the wisdom
of these admonishments, constitutional scholars must be concerned that they not
be used to support undue encroachment upon free speech.
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Part II will use data compiled by the Federal Ministry of the Interior to
sketch a picture of right-wing extremism and Neo-Nazism in
contemporary Germany. As will be shown, right-wing extremism and
Neo-Nazism in Germany is more than just a ghost of the past. Part III turns
to the clash of the courts, illustrating the two sides of the debate using the
case that was the basis for the 2004 decision of the Federal Constitutional
Court's First Senate.
Part IV then turns to recent legislative activity in connection with the
60th anniversary of the end of World War II. Part V tries to identify the
scope of democratic public discourse, first placing references to U.S. First
Amendment doctrine into context, then examining the justifiable limits on
free speech, and finally turning to public discourse at the fringes. While
there is a historically justifiable limit to free speech in Germany, widening
speech restrictions threaten to undermine the legitimacy of the limit. The
new legislative activities and the stance proposed by the state
administrative court endanger the rather delicate balance between freedom
of expression and countervailing constitutional interests that the Federal
Constitutional Court has established.
II. NEO-NAZISM & RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN
CONTEMPORARY GERMANY

The Federal Ministry of the Interior (Bundesinnenministerium)and the
Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt far
Verfassungsschutz) monitor the activities of far-right organizations and
report their findings in the Annual Reports on the Protection of the
Constitution (Verfassungsschutzbericht). These reports also include
information on the activities of other groups and organizations opposed to
the current democratic order, such as far-left organizations, and religious
extremist organizations. Using data from the Annual Reports, this section
will first provide a sketch ofcontemporary far-right and Neo-Nazi criminal
activity in Germany, then turn to the activities of far-right political parties
in Germany. It should be noted, however, that the Annual Reports
themselves have been the target of criticism because of their potentially
chilling effect on political speech.7
7. See, e.g., Ginter Bertram, KollateralschddeneinerwehrhaftenDemokratie? [Collateral
Damage of a Militant Democracy?] 59 NEUE JuRisTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr 2967, 2968 (2006);
Dietrich Murswiek, Der Verfassungsschutzbericht-das scharfe Schwert der streitbaren
Demokratie-ZurProblematikder Verdachtsberichterstattung[The Report on the Protection ofthe
Constitution-The Sharp Sword of Militant Democracy-On the Problems of Reporting
Suspicion], 23 NEUE ZErsCHRIFr FOR VERWALTUNGSRECHT [NVwZ] 769, 769-70 (2004)
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A. Right- Wing PoliticallyMotivated Crime andRight- Wing Extremism
According to the 2005 Annual Report on the Protection of the
Constitution,8 right-wing politically motivated crime is increasing.' Data
cited in the Annual Reports on politically motivated crime is based on
information from the Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt,
BKA). l° According to the report, "[a]n offence is defined as politically
motivated if the circumstances ofthe offence or the attitude of the offender
lead to the conclusion that it is directed at individuals due to their political
beliefs, nationality, ethnic origin, race, color, religion, ideology, origin,
sexual orientation, disability, appearance or social status."" In the 2005
report, 15,914 criminal offences were classified as right-wing politically
motivated crime compared to 12,553 criminal offense in the previous
year." According to the report's definition, "[c]rimes motivated by rightwing extremism constitute a subset of... right-wing politically-motivated
crime."' 3 Of the 15,914 criminal offenses classified as right-wing
politically motivated crime, "10,905 ... were propaganda crimes pursuant

to Sections 86, 86a of the Criminal Code... and 1,034... were violent
crimes. In this area, 15,361 criminal offences were recorded as motivated
by extremism,... including 958 violent crimes."' 4 As such, "[t]he number
of criminal offences with a right-wing extremist background... rose by
27.5% while that of violent crimes with a right-wing extremist background
rose by 23.5%."" 5 Of the right-wing violent crimes, in 2005, 355 (37.1%)
showed an extremist and xenophobic background. Another 316 (33%)
were directed at actual or supposed left-wing extremists.16 Violent crimes

(asserting that the current practice is unconstitutional). But see Hans-Jiirgen Doll, Der
Verfassungsschutzbericht-einunverzichtbaresMittelzurgeistig-politischenAuseinandersetzung
mit dempolitisch Motivierten Extremismus [The Report on the Protection of the Constitution-An

Indispensible Means for the Intellectual-Political Debate with Politically Motivated Extremism],
24 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFr FOR VERWALTUNGSRECHT [NVwZ] 658, 658-59 (2005)(for a reply to
Murswiek).
8. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF THE

CONSTITUTION [hereinafter 2005 ARPC], available at http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/
download/show/vsbericht2005_engl/vsbericht_2005_engl.pdf.
9. Id. at 20.
10. Id. at 18.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 20.

13.
14.
15.
16.

2005 ARPC, supra note 8, at 20.
Id.
Id.
Id. at22.
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with an anti-Semitic background were reported in 49 cases, accounting for
5.1% of all violent right-wing crimes.17
Anti-Semitism is a basic element of right-wing extremist ideology.
Although the number of individuals holding such views has been
decreasing since the 1950s, the Federal Office for the Protection of the
Constitution warned in a 2002 report on "The Role of anti-Semitism in
current German right-wing extremism" that it should not be
underestimated. 8 In 2005, there were 1,658 right-wing crimes with an
extremist and anti-Semitic background reported, representing an increase
of 25.9% compared to the previous year. 9
A geographic distribution of violent crimes reveals that North RhineWestphalia, Germany's most populous state, had the highest aggregate
number of violent crimes with 121 registered offenses.2 ° When adjusted
for crimes per 100,000 residents, however, North Rhine-Westphalia ranges
toward the bottom of the violent crimes list. 21 In per capita terms, the

highest numbers of violent crimes were recorded in Saxony-Anhalt,
followed by Brandenburg, Thuringia, and Saxony.22
B. Far-RightPoliticalParties
Several far-right political parties remain active in Germany. Some, in
recent elections, even won seats in several state legislatures. Political
parties have a central role in German democracy as described in Article
21(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany or Basic
Law. 23 They aid the formation of the people's political will, and thus, one
may call political parties "the principal organs of political

17. Id at 25.
18. FEDERAL OFFICE FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE CONSTrUTION, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF

ANTI-SEMITISM IN CuRRENT GERMAN RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM (2002), available at
http://www.extremismus.com/vs/antisemitism-e.pdf.
19. 2005 ARPC, supra note 8, at 25.
20. Id. at 27.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Article 21(1) of Grundgesetz fir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland states that "The
political parties participate in the forming of the political will of the people. They may be freely
established. Their internal organization must conform to democratic principles. They have to
publicly account for the sources and use of their funds and for their assets." Translation taken from
THE BASIC LAW (GRUNDGESETZ): THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBuC OF GERMANY 74

(May 23, 1949) (Axel Tschentscher trans., 2003) [hereinafter Tschentscher], availableat http://
www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/lit/thebasiclaw.pdf.
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representation."24 Therefore, political parties are privileged under the
Constitution insofar as only the Federal Constitutional Court can declare
them unconstitutional, as opposed to such groups that are not political
parties or groups that the executive branch may prohibit." This is known
as the political party privilege (Parteienprivileg)of Article 21. This
privilege also has consequences for the freedom of assembly. Assemblies
of political parties cannot be prohibited on the basis that other state actors,
such as the federal legislature (Bundestag) or the state chamber
(Bundesrat) or the federal government, deem these parties
unconstitutional, or if a party prohibition is pending before the Federal
Constitutional Court.26
1. Political Participation
Overall, the membership numbers of right-wing extremist political
parties in Germany have declined since 2001 .27 The National Democratic
Party of Germany (NationaldemokratischeParteiDeutschlands,NPD) is
perhaps the most notorious far-right political party active in Germany
today. Recently, the party membership has been assessed at between five
and six thousand members. 28 Far-right parties with antidemocratic
platforms routinely participate in state and federal elections. The NPD, for
example, participated in every state in the September 18, 2005 federal
elections. 29 Its candidate lists included candidates from the NPD, DVU
(Deutsche Volksunion, German People's Union), and Neo-Nazi
organizations. 30 Specifically, the NPD had direct candidates for 295 of the

24. Donald P. Kommers, German Constitutionalism:A Prolegomenon,40 EMoRY L.J. 837,
853 (1991).
25. Judith Wise, Dissent and the Militant Democracy: The German Constitution and the
Banning of the Free German Workers Party, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 301, 308 (1998).
26. Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, Neuere Rechtsprechung des BVerfG zur
Versammlungsfreiheit [Recent Decisions of the BVerfG on Freedom of Assembly], 21 NEUE
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR VERWALTUNGSRECHT [NVwZ] 257, 260 (2002).
27. Political Party membership (DVU, NPD, REP): 33,000 in 2001; 28,100 in 2002; 24,500
in 2003; 23,800 in 2004; 21,500 in 2005.2005 ARPC, supranote 8, at 47; 2004 ARPC at 28; 2003
ARPC at 27. It should be noted that the status of Die Republikaner (REP) as an extremist party is
somewhat questionable. The ARPC itself states that "not every member of the [REP] can be
considered a right-wing extremist." 2005 ARPC, supra note 8, at 46.
28. The Federal Ministry of the Interior assesses the numbers for each year, respectively, at
6,000 in 2005,5,300 in 2004,5,000 in 2003,6,100 in 2002.2005 ARPC, supra note 8, at 47; 2004
ARPC at 28.
29. 2005 ARPC, supra note 8, at 82-83.
30. Id.
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299 voting districts.3 The NPD received 1.6% of the second votes, an
increase of 1.2% from the 2002 federal elections.32 It "received 1.1% of
the votes in western Germany (and West Berlin) and 3.6% of the votes in
eastern Germany (and East Berlin)."33 The highest vote was achieved in
Saxony (4.8%), followed by Thuringia (3.7%), and Mecklenburg-Western
Pomerania (3.5%).34 The lowest vote was achieved in North RhineWestphalia (0.8%)." The NPD's appeal is greatest with young male
voters. In the 2005 federal elections, "5.2% of young male voters (age
18-24) . . . voted for the NPD, as did 9.5% of all36 voters in eastern
Germany, including 4.7% of male voters of all ages.
Further, the NPD has successfully participated in elections on the state
level, winning seats in the state legislatures of two states, MecklenburgWest Pommerania and Saxony.3 7 The presence of NPD legislators in the
state legislatures of two states has caused considerable outrage, fueled by
several high-profile incidents reflecting the party's far-right agenda. One
such incident, which received front page coverage in the national media,
involved members of the Saxony legislature refusing to participate in a
moment of silence commemorating the 60th anniversary of the liberation
of Auschwitz.38 In late 2005, however, three MPs of the Saxony legislature
left the NPD, citing among other reasons objections to the "Fourth
Reich"
39
strategy of the party and its endorsement of National Socialism.
The NPD initiated cooperation with the DVU, which has won seats in
the state of Brandenburg.4" The DVU boasts the largest membership of all
right-wing extremist parties, with an estimated 9,000 members in 2005,
down from 11,000 members in 2004. 4" The "Pact for Germany" between
the NPD and the DVU is intended to keep the parties from campaigning

31. Id. at 83.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 2005 ARPC, supra note 8, at 83.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Severin Weiland, NPD-Schock in Sashsen-Milbradt Abgestraft, Spiegel Online, Sept.
19,2004, Online at http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0, 1518,318817,00.html; Frust uber
Einzug der NPD, Spiegel Online, Sept. 17, 2006, Online at http://www.spiegel.de/politik/
deutschland/0,1518,437529,00.html.
38. See, e.g., Die UNgedenken der Auschwitz-Opfer In Berlin Empdrung Uber die NPD,
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Jan. 25, 2005, at 1-2; Reiner Burger, Briillende
Parlamentsfeinde,id. at 3.

39. 2005 ARPC, supra note 8, at 82.
40. Id. at 92-93.
41. Id. at 86.
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against each other.4 2 There continues to be substantial disagreement,
however, between the NPD and the DVU concerning cooperation with
Neo-Nazi groups. While the NPD views Neo-Nazis favorably, and has
leading Neo-Nazis in the party leadership, the DVU disapproves of close
Neo-Nazi ties.43
In the 2005 state elections in North-Rhine Westphalia and SchleswigHolstein, the NPD did not receive enough votes to win seats in the state
legislature." It received 0.9% of the vote in North Rhine-Westphalia,
outperforming another far-right party, the Republicans (DieRepublikaner)
which received only 0.8% of the votes.45 The absolute number of votes for
the NPD, however, significantly increased since the previous state election
in 2000. The NPD received 2,357 votes (less than one-tenth of a percent)
in 2000, compared to 73,969 votes (0.9%) in 2005. 46
The NPD continued its "battle for the streets," in 2005. The number of
demonstrations and public events put on by the NPD and its youth
organization, Junge Nationaldemokraten (YoungNational Democrats,JN),
and other Neo-Nazis and skinheads rose significantly from about 40 in
2004 to 60 in 2005.47 Part Ell of this Article is primarily concerned with
demonstrations the NPD or its subsections held, or wanted to hold, in the
state of North Rhine-Westphalia.
2. Militant Democracy and the Failed NPD Ban
Recently, there were efforts to ban the NPD as a political party
pursuant to Article 21 (2).48 The Federal Constitutional Court can declare
political parties unconstitutional if"by reason of their aims or the behavior
of their adherents, [they] seek to impair or abolish the free democratic
basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at81.
Id. at 80-81.
2005 ARPC, supra note 8, at 83.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 79.
Tschentscher, supra note 23, art. 21.
(2) Parties which, by reason of their aims or the behavior of their adherents, seek
to impair or abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence
of the Federal Republic of Germany are unconstitutional. The Federal
Constitutional Court decides on the question of unconstitutionality.
(3) Details are regulated by federal statutes.
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Germany.... ."' Article 21(2) is a central aspect in the militant democracy
scheme adopted in the Constitution.5 ° The Basic Law implements a variety
of mechanisms created for the protection of democracy, Article 18 allows
the government to suspend basic individual rights (a provision which, to
date, has never been used); Article 5(2) provides for restrictions on
expression; Article 20(4) guarantees a right of resistance in defense of
democracy; Article 79(2) restricts amendments to the Basic Law itself; and
Articles 9 and 21(2) allow bans of antidemocratic associations and
political parties.5 ' These provisions "both permit[] and require[] the state
to protect the democracy through the apparent paradox of intolerance of
intolerance."52 The militant democracy scheme obligates the state to
actively oppose those who intend to use the rights protected in a free
society to subvert or destroy democracy.53 As a safeguard against the abuse
of this authority, only the Federal Constitutional Court is granted the
power to issue political party bans and to rule on the forfeiture of basic
rights of individuals.54
In the Federal Republic's early years, two political party bans were
enforced. In 1952, the Socialist Reich Party (SozialistischeReichspartei,
Party
SRP) was banned and ordered to dissolve.55 In 1956, the Communist
56
fate.
same
the
met
KPD)
Deutschlands,
Partei
(Kommunistische

49. Id.; Kommers, supra note 24, at 853-54.
50. See, e.g., Wise, supra note 25, at 301; Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr., A Comparative
Perspectiveon the FirstAmendment:Free Speech, MilitantDemocracy,andthePrimacyofDignity
as a PreferredConstitutionalValue in Germany, 78 TuL. L. REV. 1549 (2004); Brugger, supra note
6, at 5-6; David A. Jacobs, The Ban of Neo-Nazi Music: Germany Takes On the Neo-Nazis, 34
HARV. INT'L L.J. 563 (1993); Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, IntolerantDemocracies,36 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 1, 32-34 (1995) (explaining the concept of Germany's militant democracy).
51. Wise, supra note 25, at 307; Tschentscher, supra note 23, arts. 18, 5, 20, 79, 9 & 21.
52. Id. at 302.
53. Kommers, supra note 24, at 854.
54. Id.; Wise, supra note 25, at 311.
The Constitutional Court's recognition of authoritarianism in German history and
its obligation to balance the Basic Law's hierarchy of individual rights against the
state's duty to protect the democracy do mitigate the danger of renewed tyranny
in the name of the militant democracy. The division of banning authority between
the judiciary and the executive is more than a formality.
Brugger, supra note 6, at 5.
55. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG][Federal Constitutional Court] Oct 23, 1952, 2
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] I (F.R.G.) [hereinafter SRP
decision].
56. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverftG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Aug 17, 1956, 5
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 85 (F.R.G.) [hereinafter KPD
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The Federal Constitutional Court's decisions display its full awareness
of the highly problematic role of political party bans in a democratic
society. In the SRP case, the Court acknowledged the general democratic
principle permitting the manifestation of any idea, including
antidemocratic ideas, in a political party.57 However, the framers of the
German Constitution were faced with the question whether, in light of
recent experiences, certain limits should be imposed on this principle. In
particular the framers considered whether political parties should be
required to accept the fundamental principles ofdemocracy.58 Thus, parties
working toward abolishing democracy would be excluded from the
political arena.59 The Court stated that a party ban is not justified when a
party challenges individual provisions or institutions with legal means.6"
However, a party ban is justified when a party seeks to abolish supreme
fundamental values of the free democratic constitutional order.6' The
fundamental principles that the Basic Law refers to as the "free democratic
constitutional order" include, at a minimum, the enumerated human rights,
sovereignty of the people, separation of powers, government
accountability, the legality of the executive, judicial independence, and the
multi-party system, including the right to form and exercise opposition.62
After examining the membership, objectives, and party platform of the
SRP, the Federal Constitutional Court concluded that the SRP was a
substitute organization for the Nazi party and as such unconstitutional
under Article 21 (2).63 In the KPD case, the Court added that a party is not
unconstitutional if it merely refuses the fundamental principles of the free
democratic basic order. 64 Rather, a party has to be actively combative and
aggressive toward the existing order, and acting in accordance with a fixed
plan with the ultimate goal of abolishing the existing order.65 The Court
pointed out that, contrary to the KPD's assertion that the state prohibits
antidemocratic ideologies, 66 the state does not actively pursue the banning

decision]. See also Krotoszynski Jr., supra note 50, at 1590-92; Fox & Nolte, supra note 50, at 33
(discussing SRP and KPD bans); Wise, supra note 25, at 3 10-11 (discussing the KPD case).
57. SRP decision, supra note 55, at 10-11.
58. Id. at 11.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 13.
61. Id.
62. SRP decision, supra note 55, at 13.
63. Id. at 68-71.
64. KPD decision, supra note 46, at 140-41.
65. Id. at 140-41.
66. Id. at 143.
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of antidemocratic parties, but rather acts defensively in guarding its basic
order.67
Enforcement of association and party bans became less strict between
the seventies and the early nineties, a trend attributed to a growing
confidence in Germany's democratic processes and institutions.68 In the
aftermath of German reunification, however, a rise in xenophobic violence
was met with an increased activity in banning antidemocratic
organizations.6 9
In 2003, however,the Federal Constitutional Court denied applications
for a party ban submitted by the federal government, the federal legislature
7 ° A qualified majority of
(Bundestag) and the state chamber (Bundesrat).
the Second Senate's members would have been required to proceed with
a ban.71 In this case, however, the qualified majority requirement was not
met as three judges found that there was an obstacle to proceeding with the
ban.72 The asserted obstacle stemmed from the fact that undercover agents
had become active in the party in order to monitor party activities and to
gather evidence for the upcoming party ban proceedings.73
Judges Hassemer, BroB, and Osterloh, however, found the presence of
state agents in elevated positions of the party leadership to be highly
problematic because these agents would inevitably influence the opinion
formation process of the party they sought to ban.74 A role in party
leadership, whether taking an active or passive approach, necessarily
influences the public appearance of the party and its platform.7" In political
party ban proceedings it is essential that the party presents itself according
to its own self-determined role, free from state influence.76
Members of the party leadership who are state agents inevitably taint
the necessary free and self-determined self-representation of the party
before the Federal Constitutional Court.77 The three judges stated that
party ban proceedings are the most effective, but at the same time double-

67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 140-41.
Krotoszynski Jr., supra note 50, at 1592.
Id.; Wise, supra note 25, at 301-02; Fox & Nolte, supra note 50, at 34.
Bundesverfassungsgericbt [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 18, 2003, 107
ENTscHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICrtTS [BVerfGE] 339 (F.R.G.).
71. Id. at 356-57.
72. Id. at 356.
73. Id. at 346-56.
74. Id. at 366.
75. Bundesverfassungsgericht, supra note 70, at 367.
76. Id. at 367-68.
77. Id. at 368.
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edged, weapon of the democratic state against its organized enemies."
Therefore, it requires the highest degree of legal certainty, transparency,
and dependability. This requirement extends to facts as well: individuals
and their conduct have to be unambiguously attributable either to the
petitioner requesting the party ban or to the political party itself.79 Only if
these requirements are met can a sound decision on the constitutionality
of a political party be made."°
In 2006 the federal government announced that it did not intend to
apply for another NPD party ban because renewed proceedings were
unlikely to be successful."l This stance was reiterated by Interior Minister
Wolfgang Schiuble in May 2007. He asserted that rather than removing
the state agents from their NPD leadership positions in anticipation of new
party ban proceedings, the agents would prove more useful in continuing
to monitor the party's activities.8 2 Thus, as long as the NPD is not found
to be unconstitutional and prohibited by the Federal Constitutional Court,
it remains free to operate as a political party in Germany.
III. THE CLASH OF THE COURTS

The clash between the State Administrative Court of North RhineWestphalia and the Federal Constitutional Court over the limits of free
speech and assembly for Neo-Nazis and right-wing extremists is
exemplary.83 The dispute was drawn out in a series of decisions between
2001 and 2004. 84 In the first half of 2001 alone, the Federal Constitutional

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 369.
Id.
Bundesverfassungsgericht, supra note 70, at 369.
Koalition will keine neue InitiativeffirNPD-Verbot, DIE WELT, Nov 14, 2006, at 1.
Markus Decker, Gewaltbereitschaftvon rechts [Violence -Proneness From the Right],

KOLNER STADT-ANZEIGER, May 15, 2007, at 2.

83. This conflict between the courts is the subject of several recent books. GIso
HELLHAMMER-HAWIG, NEONAZISTISCHE VERSAMMLUNGEN: GRUNDRECHTSSCHUTZ UND GRENZEN

[Neo-Nazi Assemblies: Constitutional Protection and Limits] (2005); RALF ROGER,
DEMONSTRATIONSFREIHEIT FUR NEONAZIS? [Freedom to Demonstration for Neo-Nazis?] (2004).
See also JORG ANDREAS HADER, EXTREMISTISCHE DEMONSTRATIONEN ALS HERAUSFORDERUNG

DES VERSAMMLUNGSRECHTS [Extremist Demonstrations as a Challenge for the Law of Assembly]
(2003).
84. See, e.g., Oberverwaltungsgericht ffir das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [OVGNRW] [State
Administrative Court of North Rhine-Westphalia] Mar. 23, 2001, 54 NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRiFr [NJW] 2111 (2001); NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHIFr [NJW] 2069 (2001);
Oberverwaltungsgericht flir das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [OVG NRW] [State Administrative
Court ofNorth Rhine-Westphalia] Apr. 12,200 1,NEUEJUISTISCHEWOCHENScHRIT [NJW] 2113
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Court reversed five decisions of the administrative court.85
At the core of this quite extraordinary exchange was the question of the
content and scope of "public safety and order" as limits on free speech and
assembly.86 The underlying question, however, was whether right-wing
extremist and Neo-Nazi ideas can-and should be-excluded from public
discourse.
The Federal Constitutional Court is comprised of two Senates
exercising mutually exclusive jurisdiction, each staffed with eight judges
elected by the federal legislature for nonrenewable twelve year terms.87
The Senates form several chambers at the beginning of every court term
consisting of three judges each.88 The Court is a specialized court of
constitutional review; it is the only court in Germany that can declare
statutes as well as other government acts unconstitutional.89 Under section
39 of the Code of Procedure of the Federal Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz,BVerfGG), decisions of the Federal
Constitutional Court bind all other courts as well as the state and federal
legislatures and executives.9" Decisions of the chambers, however, do not
have the same binding effect. 9
The intensity of this dispute is likely unprecedented in the history of
exchanges between a state court and the Federal Constitutional Court.92
The debate is so intense that it has not only been waged in stinging court
opinions, but also in the news media, as Federal Constitutional Court
Judge Wolfgang Hoffnann-Riem, a member of the First Senate and its
First Chamber, and Michael Bertrams, President of the State
Administrative Court of North Rhine-Westphalia (and as such by law also

(2001); Federal Constitutional Court, Apr. 12,2001, at 2075 (Ostermontags-Demonstration); State
Administrative Court of North Rhine-Westphalia, Apr. 30, 2001, at 2114; Federal Constitutional
Court, May 1, 2001, at 2076 (1. Mai Demonstration). See also HELLHAMMER-HAWIG, supra note
83, at 9-26; ROGER, supra note 83, at 21-32 (for an event-by-event account of the controversy).
85. HELLHAMMER-HAWIG, supra note 83, at 3-4.
86. Id.
87. Peter E. Quint, Leadinga ConstitutionalCourt:Perspectivesfrom the FederalRepublic
of Germany, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 1853, 1855-58 (2006).
88. Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz [BverfGG] [Code of Procedure of the Federal
Constitutional Court] July 16, 1998, as amended art. 15(a).
89. Kommers, supra note 24, at 840.
90. Id.
91. ROGER, supra note 83, at 18-19.
92. Michael Kniesel & Ralf Poscher, Die Entwicklung des Versammlungsrechts 2000 bis
2003 [The Development of the Law of Assembly 2000 to 2003], 57 NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFr [NJW] 422, 425 (2004).
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President of the State Constitutional Court of North Rhine-Westphalia93 ),
exchanged blows in the daily newspaper FrankfurterRundschau,bringing
the dispute to a wider audience.94 It seems quite remarkable that two sitting
judges of such stature went head-to-head in this fashion, thus underscoring
the importance of the issue at hand. Nonetheless, it took until 2004 for the
full First Senate to decide this issue, despite calls to do so well before then.
Perhaps the most notable call was from Ernst Benda, former President of
the Federal Constitutional Court, who in 2001 suggested that in light of the
importance of the issue a Senate decision might be desirable.95
The sequence of events was the same in each case. Local authorities
would prohibit planned right-wing assemblies.96 The state administrative
court, as the highest court in the state's administrative system, would
uphold the ban.9 7 The organizers would seek to enjoin the local authorities
before the Federal Constitutional Court, whose First Chamber of the First
Senate would strike down the ban.98

93. Section 2(2) of the Gesetz Ober den Verfassungsgerichtshof ffir das Land NordrheinWestfalen (VGHG NW) [Law of the State Constitutional Court of North Rhine-Westphalia] Dec.
14, 1989, § 2(2) states that the president of the state constitutional court is the president of the state
administrative court.
94. Wolfgang Hoffrnann-Riem, Die Luftrdhre der Demokratie [The Windpipe of
Democracy], FRANKFURTER RuNDsCAu, July 11, 2002, at 14 (expressing the central claim that
freedom of assembly is essential for a functioning democracy); Michael Bertrams, DieRenaissance
des Rechisextremismus wird verharmlost [The Renaissance of Right Wing Extremism is Being
Trivialized], FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, July 16, 2002, at 14 (accusing Hoffmann-Riem and the
First Chamber of underestimating the "renaissance" of Neo-Nazism in Germany).
95. Ernst Benda, Kammermusik, schrill [Chamber Music, Shrill], 54 NEUE JURISTISCHE
WocHENscHRFr [NJW] 2947, 2948 (2001).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See also RoGER, supra note 83, at 16-18. Procedurally, the administrative agency's ban
was effective immediately pursuant to section 80(2)(1) No. 4 of the Code of Administrative
Procedure (Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung,VwGO). The initial challenges consisted of(a) the appeal
to the administrative agency ordering the ban according to section 68 ofthe Code of Administrative
Procedure and (b) the request to the administrative court to reinstate the suspensive effect of the
appeal pursuant to section 80(5) ofthe Code of Administrative Procedure. Before the administrative
court, either the NPD or the state prevailed, so that either one applied to the state administrative
court, depending on the outcome. The state administrative court routinely proceeded to deny
applications by the NPD or grant applications by the state. Seeking an injunction from the Federal
Administrative Court, under section 32 of the Code of Procedure of the Federal Constitutional
Court, the NPD then submitted an application based on a violation of Articles 5 and 8 by the
preceding decisions.
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A. Constitutionaland StatutoryBackground
Freedom of Assembly is guaranteed in Article 8 of the Basic Law,
which states "(1) All Germans have the right, without prior notification or
permission, to assemble peaceably and unarmed. (2) With regard to
openair assemblies, this right may be restricted by or pursuant to a
statute."99 The leading case in the area of freedom of assembly is the
Federal Constitutional Court's 1985 Brockdorfdecision. 0' 0 The Brockdorf
decision dealt with the constitutionality of an assembly ban at the site of
a planned nuclear power plant and its surrounding area that aimed to
prevent protests by several citizens' and environmental protection
groups.' The Federal Constitutional Court, in emphasizing the important
role of freedom of assembly in a democracy, stated:
[The] stabilizing function of the freedom of assembly for the
representative system is rightly described as allowing
dissatisfaction, discontent and criticism to be brought out openly
and worked off, and as operating as a necessary condition for the
political early-warning system that points to potential disruption,
making shortfalls in integration visible and thus also allowing
course corrections by official policy... .102
Section 15 of the Federal Law of Assembly (Versaminmlungsgesetz, VersG)
regulates the prohibition of assemblies held outside, pursuant to the
limitation clause of Article 8(2).03 While section 15 of the Federal Law of
Assembly refers to both public safety"° as well as public order,0 5 the
Federal Constitutional Court in Brockdorf held that, generally, a mere
danger to public order is insufficient to justify the prohibition of an

99. Tschentscher, supra note 23, art. 8.
100. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 14, 1985, 69
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 315, (F.R.G.) [hereinafter
Brockdorf decision]. Translated in Brockdorf Decision of the First Senate 1 BvR 233,
http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work-new/german/case.php?id=656.
101. Id.
102. Brockdorf decision, supra note 100, at 347, translated in Brugger, supra note 6, at 8.
103. Versammlungsgesetz [VersG Federal Law of Assembly] § 15, available at
http://www.lexsoft.cle/lexisnexis/Justizportal_ nrw.cgi.
104. "Public safety" is defined as all written and unwritten legal norms, the whole legal order,
the existence of the state and its institutions and activities and all individual rights. See, e.g.,
Brockdorf decision, supra note 100, at 352.
105. "Public order" is defined as the unwritten rules that, according to the prevalent local
social and ethical standards compatible with the constitutional value order, are the indispensable
basis of orderly human coexistence. See, e.g., id.
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assembly. °6 This is based on the constitutional principle of minimum
intervention: if the danger can be averted with less intrusive instruments,
such as placing conditions on the assembly, a prohibition is not
necessary."°7 Conditions frequently implemented on Neo-Nazi and rightwing extremist assemblies target the participants' appearance; common
prohibitions include, for example, prohibitions on wearing uniforms or
uniform parts, carrying flags, and carrying drums.'08
For the ensuing discussion it is crucial to note that the contentious issue
is always the banning of the demonstration as a preventive measure, based
on the expected threat to public order.0 9 The threat to public order, as
opposed to the threat to public safety, does not require the violation of, or
expected violation of, a criminal prohibition. Prohibiting an assembly, or
forcing it to disband as a repressive measure, when a violation of a
criminal prohibition is imminent, or has in fact occurred, provided the
measure is proportional, is not disputed. In the context of a right-wing
extremist assembly, infringements or bans meeting the proportionality
requirement are not controversial where there are violations or impending
violations of the Criminal Code, such as the incitement to hatred provision
of section 130.t10 In fact, the Federal Constitutional Court has repeatedly

106. Id. at 353.
107. Friedrich Schoch, Die Neuregelungdes Versammlungsrechts durch § 1511 VersG [The
Revision of Law of Assembly by § 15 II VersG], 28 JURA: JURISTISCHE AUSBILDUNG 27, 28-29
(2006). See also Brockdorf decision, supra note 100, at 353.
108. Wolfgang Leist, Zur RechtmiiBigkeit typischer Auflagen bei rechtsextremistischen
Demonstrationen [On the Legality of Typical Conditions on Right Wing Extremist
Demonstrations], 22 NEUEZEITSCHRFrFURVERWALTUNGSRECHT [NvwZ] 1300 (2003); Wolfgang
Hoffinann-Riem, DemonstrationsfreiheitauchfiirRechtsextremisten?-Grundsatziiberlegungen
zum Gebot rechtsstaatlicherToleranz [Freedom ofDemonstration also for Right Wing Extremists?
Fundamental Thoughts on the Command of Tolerance in Accordance with the Rule of Law], 57
NEUEJURISTISCHEWOCHENSCHRIFr [NJW] 2777,2781 (2004) (discussing also the constitutionality
of these measures). See also HELLHAMMER-HAWIG, supranote 83, at 115-17.
109. Ulrich Battis & Klaus Joachim Grigoleit, Neue Herausforderungen ffir das
Versammlungsrecht? [New Challenges for the Law of Assembly?] 20 NEUE ZEITSCIRIFr FUR
VERWALTUNGSRECHT [NVwZ] 121, 125 (2001).
110. Such as section 86 and 86a (dissemination of propaganda by unconstitutional
organizations, use of symbols of unconstitutional organizations). See, e.g., Brugger, supra note 6,
at 14-17 (discussing criminal provisions protecting collective defamation); Winfried Brugger, Ban
On or Protectionof Hate Speech? Some ObservationsBased on German and American Law, 17
TuL. EuR. & Civ. L.F. 1, 5 (2002) [hereinafter Brugger, Ban On] (discussing section 130 and
individual defamation or insult punishable under sections 185-200 of the Criminal Code).
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stated that in such cases, a ban may be justified."' Finally, if such criminal2
acts are committed during an assembly, the assembly can be disbanded. 1
B. OngoingDisagreement Over Assembly Bans and the 2004 First
Senate Decision
The sequence of events in the case that led to the 2004 Senate decision
followed the sequence of previous cases. In December 2003 the North
Rhine-Westphalian NPD announced plans to hold two marches in the city
of Bochum in March 2004."' The motto was "Stoppt den
Synagogenbau-4 Millionen ffr das Volk!" ("Stop the building of the
synagogue--4 million for the people! ").11' The local authorities prohibited
the march and all substitute events on this or any other day within the
entire jurisdiction.' ' Initially, the NPD successfully appealed the decision
before the local administrative court.16
1. Decisions of March 2004
The state administrative court ruled that the planned assemblies posed
a threat to public safety." 7 According to the court, the motto itself would
already be punishable as incitement to hatred (Volksverhetzung) under
section 130 No. 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code, because it displayed an
obviously anti-Semitic message." 8 The motto singled out the Jewish
population as not being part of "the people," it violated the Jewish
population's claim to respect. Further, it disturbed the peaceful coexistence
of Jews and non-Jews in Germany. Consequently, the state administrative
court found a ban under the protection of public safety provision of section

111. Kniesel & Poscher,supranote 92, at 425; Donat Wege, Prdventive Versammlungsverbote
auf dem verfassungsrechtlichen Priifstand [Preventive Prohibitions of Assembly on the
Constitutional Test Stand], 24 NEUE ZEITSCIiF FOR VERWALTUNGSRECHT [NVwZ] 900, 902
(2005).
112. Wege, supra note 111, at 902.
113. Oberverwaltungsgericht ffir das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [OVG NRW] [State
Administrative Court of North Rhine-Westphalia] Mar. 2, 2004, docket no. 5B 393/04, 3.
114. Verwaltungsgericht Gelsenkirchen [VG Gelsenkirchen] [Administrative Court of
Gelsenkirchen Feb. 18, 2004, docket no. 14 L 252/04, 9; OVG NRW, supra note 113, 4.
115. OVGNRW, supranote 113, 10.
116. Verwaltungsgericht Gelsenkirchen [VG Gelsenkirchen] [Administrative Court of
Gelsenkirchen] Feb 18, 2004, docket no. 14 L 252/04, available at http://www.justiz.nrw.de/
nrwe/ovgs/vggelsenkirchen/j2004/14 L 252 04beschluss20040218.html.
117. OVGNRW, supra note 113,7 23.
118. Id. 724.
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15 of the Federal Law of Assembly to be justified." 9 The First Chamber
of the Federal Constitutional Court's First Senate upheld the decision
insofar as it based the ban on a threat to public safety.12 As already
mentioned, if violations of criminal provisions are imminent in the context
of a right-wing extremist assembly, a ban that satisfies the general
proportionality requirement is uncontroversial. 2 ' The First Chamber
further accepted the state administrative court's assessment that conditions
in this case could not be implemented by less restrictive means.' 22
Additionally, and more controversially, the state administrative court
found that a threat to public order supported the prohibition of the
assembly as well.'23 The court reasoned, in line with its previous decisions,
that the Constitution does not legitimize extremist ideologies like Nazism.
The value order of the Constitution, the court argued, establishes internal
limits stemming from an overall rejection of National Socialism, that are
sufficient to constitute limits on the freedom of assembly.124 These internal
limits must also be considered below the threshold ofcriminal prohibitions
or constitutional provisions regarding association or party bans or
forfeiture of rights. The immediate threat to public order cannot be averted
by placing conditions on the assembly.'25 Even though this specific part of
the decision was not upheld by the First Chamber, the ban stood
nonetheless,
having been sufficiently justified by the threat to public
126
safety.

2. Decisions of June 2004
In March 2004, the North Rhine-Westphalian NPD announced a
demonstration to be held in Bochum in June. The motto this time was
"Keine Steuergelderfar den Synagogenbau. FirMeinungsfreiheit." ("No
tax money for building the synagogue. For freedom of expression"). 127 The
local authorities considered this a substitute event falling within the prior
119. Oberverwaltungsgericht ffir das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [OVG NRW] [State
Administrative Court of North Rhine-Westphalia] Mar 2, 2004, docket no. 5 B 392/04,
22-41,
availableathttp://www justiz.nrw.de/nrwe/orgs/orgnrw/j2004/5B39204beschluss2004O302.
html.
120. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 12, 2004, 23
NEUE ZErrSCHRIFr FUR VERWALTUNGSRECHT [NVwZ] 1111, 1111 (2004).
121. Kniesel & Poscher, supra note 92, at 425.
122. Bundesverfassungsgericht, supra note 120, at 1112.
123. State Administrative Court, supra note 119, 42.
124. Id. 43-45.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. HELLHAMMER-HAWIG, supra note 83, at 24.
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prohibition. 12' Again, the NPD initially appealed the decision to the local
administrative court and was successful.' 2 9 The state administrative court
then overruled the local administrative court and reinstated the ban based
on a threat to public order pursuant to section 15(1) of the Federal Law of
Assembly. 3 ' The court argued that merely changing the assembly's motto
did not eliminate the provocation aimed at the Jewish population. 3 '
Instead, the court noted that the old motto's divisive and agitating
intention persisted in the public consciousness.3 2 The changes were only
cosmetic in order to avoid punishment for incitement to hatred under
section 130(1) of the Criminal Code. Beyond the cosmetic change, the
NPD's intent, according to the court, was to continue to publicly
disseminate its anti-Semitic message which was "no synagogue in
Bochum."' 33
The Federal Constitutional Court's full First Senate unanimously
overruled the state administrative court and granted the NPD an injunction
against the ban.' 3 4 It rejected the state administrative court's opinion that
Neo-Nazi demonstrations can be prohibited because of the public
articulation of Neo-Nazi ideology based on either internal constitutional
limits or public order even if the content is not criminally prohibited.'
The Court noted that content of speech is protected under Article 5(1) and
limited only by Article 5(2), even if voiced in an assembly.'36 Thus,
according to the Court, a limit on the content of speech is only permissible
under Article 5(2) if it is a general, that is, content-neutral law, or if it
protects the right to personal honor or serves the protection of the youth.'37
The state administrative court based its decision exclusively on the content
of expected speech. 38 Limits on the content of speech pursuant to Article
5(2) are found in the Criminal Code, barring recourse to the threat to
128. Id.
129. Verwaltungsgericht Gelsenkirchen [VG Gelsenkirchen] [Administrative Court of
Gelsenkirchen], June 9, 2002, docket no. 14 L 1286/04.
130. Oberverwaltungsgericht fir das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [OVG NRW] [State
Administrative Court of North Rhine-Westphalia], June 21, 2004, docket no. 5 B 1208/04, 15.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. 7.
134. Bundesverfassunsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], 57 NEUEJURISTISCHE
WoCHENScHRIFr [NJW] 2814 (2004) [hereinafter First Senate decision].
135. Id. at2815.
136. Id.; see also Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 13,
1994, 90 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 241, 246 (F.R.G.)
[hereinafter Holocaust Denial decision] (concerning section 5 of the Federal Law of Assembly).
137. Bundesverfassungsgericht, supra note 134, at 2815.
138. BverfG, supra note 136, at 2815.
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public order provision. 39
' The Court repeated the fundamental presumption
that the expression of opinions in a pluralistic democracy is generally free,
unless the legislature has limited freedom of expression according to
Article 5(2). 14 According to the definition ofpublic order, minority speech
would only be protected if it did not offend the current social and ethical
community standards.'41 This, however, contradicts the nature of the right
to freedom of speech. As far as the Criminal Code protects against antiSemitic or racist speech, a violation of these provisions would constitute
a threat to public safety. The limitation possibility contained in section
15(1) of the Federal Law of Assembly refers only to the scope of
constitutional protection awarded under Article 8(1), and may not be used
to limit the content of speech. 142
Public order can still be violated, regardless of the content of opinions,
by the manner in which the assembly is conducted. For example,
aggressive, provoking, and intimidating conduct that creates an
atmosphere conducive to violence may violate the public order. Similarly,
holding a right-wing extremist assembly on a day specifically dedicated
to commemorating Nazi terror and the Holocaust, 4 3 or intimidating
citizens through the overall appearance of a demonstration or assembly
with Nazi rites and symbols may violate the public order.'" In such cases
the assembly may be prohibited if, after considering the particular
circumstances, less restrictive measures to avert the threat to public order
do not exist.
Colliding fundamental rights of others can only pose a limit to free
speech if they are enshrined in a law. There is no internal constitutional
limit on proclaiming a Neo-Nazi ideology. Agreeing that the Basic Law
established a militant democracy, the Federal Constitutional Court stated
that the legal order protects the free democratic basic order in the
provisions of the Criminal Code, as well as constitutional provisions in
Articles 9(2), 18, and 21(2). 4' These provisions preclude a justification
based on internal constitutional limits for other infringements in order to
protect the free democratic basic order.'" The state administrative court's
assessment that the Basic Law's mechanisms for averting right-wing

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id.
Id.
First Senate decision, supra note 134, at 2815.
See infra Part V (discussing the Holocaust Memorial Day decision).
First Senate decision, supra note 134, at 2815-16.
Id.
Id.
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extremist and Neo-Nazi dangers to the free democratic basic order are
insufficient does not justify the creating of new limits by way of judgemade law since only the limitation
provisions contained in the Basic Law
47
1
limitations.
necessary
constitute
3. Summary of the Conflicting Positions of the Courts
The back and forth between the Federal Constitutional Court and the
state administrative court, culminating in the 2004 decision, highlights two
fundamentally opposite positions. On the one hand is the militant
democracy position that believes in tolerating the views of its enemies
because it trusts the courage of its citizens to protect it. On the other hand,
a second Weimar Republic that played into the hands of its enemies while
the courts were merely spectators is to be prevented.
4
In between, many questions of constitutional doctrine remain.1
According to the state administrative court, an ideology like National
Socialism cannot be legitimized under the Basic Law. 149 The values laid
down in the Basic Law establish an internal constitutional limit that has to
be respected when interpreting Articles 5(1) and 8(1), even short of the
militant democracy provisions allowing association and party bans as well
as forfeiture of individual rights.
Assemblies that are defined by a commitment to National Socialism
thus can be prohibited as a threat to public order under section 15(1) of the
Federal Law of Assembly. 0 Public order itself is decidedly shaped by the
canon of values established in the Constitution, especially the commitment
to peace, human dignity, democracy, federalism, and the rule of law.' 5'
The Federal Constitutional Court, however, distinguishes between the
content of opinions, subject to protection under Article 5(1), and the
manner in which the opinion is articulated, subject to Article 8.152
As far as the content of speech is concerned, only Article 5(2) imposes
a limit.' 53 Opinions that cannot be limited under that provision cannot be
limited by Article 8(2) either. 5 4 The Federal Constitutional Court finds

147. Id. at 2816.
148. Ulrike Lembke, Grundfdlle zu Art. 8 GG, 45 JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG [JUS] 1081, 1083
(2005).
149. Cf State Administrative Court ofNorth Rhine-Westphalia decisions dated Mar. 23,2001,
Apr. 12, 2001, Apr. 30, 2001, supra note 84.
150. Supra text accompanying note 139.
151. Lembke, supra note 148, at 1082.
152. HELLHAMMER-HAWIG, supra note 83, at 29.
153. Id.
154. Lembke, supra note 148, at 1082.
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that the content of opinions, as opposed to the manner of articulation,
cannot be prohibited because of an imminent danger to public order.155
The criminal prohibitions are finite as far as the content of opinions is
concerned, and a threat to public order cannot be substituted as a basis for
content prohibitions. 5 6 The Basic Law further, in Articles 9(2), 18, and
21(2), provides mechanisms to protect democracy. The existence of these
mechanisms prohibits the recourse to public order. Moreover, the content
of an assembly may not be changed by conditions. If the content of an
assembly creates a threat to public safety, however, the assembly may be
prohibited.5 7

IV. LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITIES

The debate over the scope of public discourse was further fueled by
changes to the Federal Law of Assembly and the Criminal Code in
anticipation of right-wing extremist activity in connection with the 60th
anniversary of the end of World War II in 2005. In March 2005, after
legislative proceedings that lasted less than three weeks,' 58 the federal
legislature amended section 15 of the Federal Law of Assembly and
section 130 of the Criminal Code.'5 9 The changes were triggered by
outrage among leading politicians and the public alike when the NPD
announced plans to hold a rally at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin on May
8, 2005, the 60th anniversary of the capitulation of Nazi Germany. 16 The
new legislation was intended to effectively address the steady increase of
155. Id.
156. HELLHAMMER-HAWIG, supra note 83, at 29; Lembke, supra note 148, at 1082.
157. HELLHAMMER-HAWIG, supra note 83, at 29; Lembke, supra note 148, at 1082.
158. RalfPoscher, Neue Rechtsgrundlagengegen rechtsextremistischeVersammlungen-Zu
den verfassungsrechtlichenGrenzen der Entpolitisierungder Versammlungsfreiheit[New Legal
Bases Against Right Wing Extremist Assemblies-On the Constitutional Limits offDe-Politicizing
Freedom of Assembly], 58 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr [NJW] 1316 (2005).

159. Gesetz zur Anderung des Versammlungsgesetzes und des Strafgesetzbuchs, Mar. 24,
2005, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] I, 969 (F.R.G.).
160. Schoch, supra note 107, at 27; Wolfgang Leist, DieAnderungdes Versammlungsrechts:
ein Eigentor? [The Change of the Law of Assembly: An Own Goal?], 24 NEUE ZErTSCHRIFr FOR
VERWALTUNGSRECHT [NVwZ] 500, 500 (2005); Christoph Enders & Robert Lange, Symbolische
Gesetzgebung im Versammlungsrecht? [Symbolic Law Making in the Law of Assembly?], 61
JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ] 105, 105 (2006); see also Giinter Bertram, Der Rechtsstaat und seine
Volksverhetzungs-Novelle, 58 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRiFr [NJW] 1476, 1477 (2005);
Claudia Nelles, Die Bedeutung des neuen § 1511 VersG in der Rechtsprechung von Berlin und
Brandenburg--einJahresriickblick[The Meaning of the New § 1511 VersG in the case law of
Berlin and Brandenburg-A Year in Review] 16 LANDES-uND KOMMUNALVERWALTUNG [LKV]
403, 403 (2006).
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right-wing assemblies whose themes, locations, and appearances were
increasingly similar to the assemblies of the Nazi regime. 6 ' In German
activist64
legal literature, the effort was sharply criticized as an apparently
63
show of strength, 6 2 which resulted in merely symbolic' ad-hoc'
legislation. Again, however, the fundamental questions posed were: Which
political challenges must a society deal with? Which political disputes can
be avoided by employing legal force, such as the criminal law, and which
disputes do the state have to engage in using only political weapons?' 65
A. Changes to the FederalLaw of Assembly
A new second paragraph was added to section 15 of the Federal Law
of Assembly which now allows the prohibition of or placement of
conditions on an assembly if it is held at a place that serves as a memorial
of historically outstanding, supra-regional, significance commemorating
' At the time of the
the victims of National Socialist violence and tyranny. 66
state action, there must be concrete circumstances making an infringement
on the dignity of the victims likely. Only the Holocaust Memorial in Berlin
is explicitly mentioned in the Federal Law of Assembly. The states are
authorized to identify further memorial places. To the extent that the
locations are designated as memorials, the legislative materials state that
apply, for example, to the sites of former concentration
this would
67
camps.
One commentator noted that the vagueness of the language used in the
provision might be problematic, leaving open the question regarding
whether section 15(2) would pass constitutional muster or, if it does,
would prove workable. 68 The new provision raises a number of practical
problems as well. It has been argued, for instance, that smaller and less
well-known former concentration camps would not fall under the
provision since they are not memorials of historically outstanding, supra-

161. Schoch, supra note 107, at 27; Nelles, supra note 160, at 403.
162. Poscher, supra note 158, at 1316.
163. Enders & Lange, supra note 160, at 112.
164. Schoch, supra note 107, at 31.
165. Poscher, supra note 158, at 1316.
166. Federal Law of Assembly § 15(2).
167. Poscher, supranote 158, at 1317; Enders & Lange, supranote 160, at 106; Klaus Stohrer,
Die Bekdimpfung rechtsextremistischerVersammilungen durch den neuen § 1511 VersG [Fighting
Right Wing Extremist Assemblies with the New § 1511 VersG], 46 JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG [JuS]
15, 16 (2006); HELLHAMMER-HAWIG, supra note 83, at 248-49.
168. HELLHAMMER-HAWIG, supra note 83, at 249. See also Lembke, supra note 148, at 1083
(expressing doubt regarding the constitutionality of the provision).
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regional significance.169 Moreover, other locations that have a connection
with National Socialism, and as such would be desirable rally sites for
Neo-Nazis, are completely outside the scope of the law as they are not
designated memorial sites, such as the Feldherrenhalle in Munich.
Likewise, the location that triggered this legislation, the Brandenburg Gate
in Berlin, is not within the scope of the new law. 7 ° At such locations that
do fall within the scope of the law, freedom of expression is limited in a
way that is not content-neutral. Therefore it is not a general, that is,
content-neutral, law under the limiting provision of Article 5(2).''
However, limits that are not content-neutral can be imposed on freedom
of expression under Article 5(2) if they protect personal honor. 7 2 Although
the limitation on freedom of expression does not explicitly connect to a
specific opinion, it encompasses only right-wing extremist opinions, as
intended by the legislature.' 73
Both the Federal Constitutional Court and the Federal Court of Justice
(Bundesgerichtshof,BGH) have stated that there is a link between the
genocide of Jewish citizens and the personal honor of the survivors and
their descendants:
The historical fact alone that human beings were singled
out . . . and robbed of their individuality with the goal of
exterminating them puts the Jews who live in the Federal Republic
of Germany into a special personal relationship vis-b-vis their
fellow citizens; the past is still present in this relationship today. It
is part of their personal self-perception and their dignity that they
are comprehended as belonging to a group of people who stand out
by virtue of their fate, and in relation to whom all others have a
special moral responsibility. Indeed, respect for this self-perception
is for each of them one of the guarantees against a repetition of such
discrimination, and it forms a basic condition for their life in the
Federal Republic.'74

169. Leist, supra note 160, at 502. But see Schoch, supra note 107, at 29 (stating that while
these memorial places would not fall under the new section 15(2), they would still be covered under
section 15(1) as they were in the past.)
170. Leist, supra note 160, at 502; Stohrer, supra note 167, at 16.
171. Poscher, supranote 158, at 1317; Enders & Lange, supra note 160, at 110; Stohrer, supra
note 167, at 17.
172. Poscher, supra note 158, at 1317; Schoch, supra note 107, at 30.
173. Stohrer, supra note 167, at 17.
174. Holocaust Denial decision, supra note 136, at 251-52, translatedin Brugger, Ban On,
supra note 110, at 17.
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The courts point out that the Holocaust has fundamentally shaped the
identity of the Jewish population and the claim to respect arises out of the
immeasurable suffering and injustice.' Having become part of their
dignity, the claim to respect has also become part of personal honor.'76 The
Holocaust Memorial in Berlin testifies to this claim to respect of the
Jewish population. The new provision codifies its territorial protection and
therefore is a law protecting personal honor. For other memorials a
similarly close relationship between the claim to respect and the personal
honor of the victims has to be present."' A similar protection has been
acknowledged by the Federal Constitutional Court for the Holocaust
Memorial Day. 7 8 In its Holocaust Memorial Day decision, the First
Chamber upheld a restriction on an assembly, requiring the organizers to
reschedule for the following day, because a demonstration by right-wing
extremists on this particular day would cause provocation and thus would
lead to the danger of a substantial infringement on the moral sentiments of
other citizens.' 79 By allowing content-based restrictions on the freedom of
assembly, the First Chamber followed the path the Federal Constitutional
Court paved with regard to the Holocaust in general.1 80 The constitutional
basis of the Holocaust Memorial Day decision, too, is the protection of
personal honor under Article 5(2), which poses a limit on freedom of
expression. The Holocaust Memorial Day was instituted specifically to pay
respect to the personal dignity of the victims of the Holocaust. 8' To
protect the dignity of the victims, assemblies connected to National
Socialism may be prohibited on this day. This is intended to underscore
symbolically the claim to respect of the victims of the Holocaust. As long
as a connection with personal dignity in the sense of Article 5(2) can be
made, this justification can be transferred to other memorial days or

175. Stohrer, supra note 167, at 17; Kniesel & Poscher, supra note 92, at 428; see also
Brugger, Ban On, supranote 110, at 15-21; Brugger, supranote 6, at 32-38; Krotoszynski Jr., supra
note 50, at 1593-95; Edward J. Eberle, PublicDiscoursein Contemporary Germany, 47 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 797, 892-94 (1997) (discussing the Holocaust Denial case).
176. See supranote 175.
177. Poscher, supra note 158, at 1317; Enders & Lange, supra note 160, at 107.
178. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 26, 2001, 56
Juristenzeitung [JZ] 651 (2001) [hereinafter Holocaust Memorial Day decision].
179. Id. at 652.
180. Kniesel & Poscher, supra note 92, at 428.
181. Id. Holocaust Memorial Day is January 27th, the day Auschwitz was liberated by allied
forces in 1945. President Roman Herzog declared the Holocaust Memorial Day to be a national day
of remembrance in 1996. Id. Incidentally, prior to his election as President of the Federal Republic
of Germany in 1994, Herzog was the President of the Federal Constitutional Court and Chief Judge
of the First Senate.
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places." 2 The Federal Constitutional Court's Holocaust Memorial Day
decision, however, has been criticized, as the court departed from its own
requirement of content-neutrality.' 83
A further problem raised in connection with the decision was the
exclusive reference to victims of National Socialism. Since other victims
of tyranny, such as those during the forty years of dictatorship in the
German Democratic Republic (GDR), are not mentioned, this poses the
question of a possible violation of the general equality clause of Articles
3(1) and (3). 184 The exclusivity, however, might be sufficiently justified
based on the heightened need for protection of the victims. While the
victims of the GDR system have suffered unjust treatment, they have not
been subjected to systematic public disrespect oftheir dignity; by contrast,
right-wing extremists strip the victims of National Socialism of their
dignity by denial, relativization, and derision.'85 Additionally, an argument
could be made based on the extent of the terror experienced by the victims,
which in the GDR did not amount to the level of industrialized mass
murder akin to that of the Nazi regime. Nonetheless, it was suggested that
it might have been more prudent to include the victims of all tyrannies in
section 18156 of the Federal Law of Assembly to protect their dignity
equally.
B. Changes to the Criminal Code
Following the Federal Constitutional Court's jurisprudence that the
content of speech cannot be prohibited based on public order, the
legislature consequently widened the scope of the criminal prohibition in
section 130 which, as a written legal norm, is part of public safety.' 87
Section 130 was originally introduced into the criminal code to address
increased anti-Semitic agitation in the late fifties to punish inciting the
populace to hatred. 8 8 Intended to protect the public peace, the provision
is based on the assumption that hate speech leads to hate crimes, and the
incitement to hatred provision is intended to diminish this "danger of a

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
1337-38

Kniesel & Poscher, supra note 92, at 428.
See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing the criticism).
Leist, supra note 160, at 502.
Id.
Id.
Lembke, supra note 148, at 1083.
James Q. Whitman, EnforcingCivility andRespect: ThreeSocieties, 109 YALE L.J. 1279,
(2000).
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danger." 89 Section 130(4) now criminally prohibits disturbing the public
peace by publicly or in assembly approving of, glorifying, or justifying the
National Socialist violence and terror regime in a manner that violates the
dignity of the victims.' 90
The new section 130(4) primarily protects the public peace.' 9' The
provision not only raises concerns regarding possible unconstitutional
vagueness;' 92 it also has to conform to Article 5. Defining the "public
peace" as the protection of the public from opinions expressing hostility
toward the Constitution would not be in compliance with Article 5; neither
could "public peace" be defined as the democratic consensus, thus
protecting the public from right-wing extremist challenges. Voicing
hostility toward the constitution and potentially causing outrage at home
and abroad is not a concern of the "public peace" construed in a
constitutional manner. "Public peace" can be a constitutional limit on
freedom of expression if it is understood to protect the intellectual battle
of opinions from illegitimate, non-intellectual attempts of intimidation or
threat. Protecting the intellectual battle of opinions against non-intellectual
forces does not target the content of opinions. Rather, the protection is
aimed at illegitimate, non-argumentative influences, such as economic
pressure. This was the content of the Federal Constitutional Court's
Blinkfiier 93 decision. In its more recent jurisprudence, the Federal
Constitutional Court not only upheld, but also formulated conditions that
can be placed on assemblies to avoid the danger of intimidation or threat
from right-wing extremist assemblies. 94
Like the new section 15(2), section 130(4) is not content-neutral, and
therefore does not constitute a general law under Article 5(2). 195 The
component "in a manner violating the dignity of the victims" establishes
the connection to the limit of freedom of expression in the laws protecting

189. Winfried Brugger, Hassrede, Beleidigung, Volksverhetzung [Hate Speech, Insult,

Incitement to Hatred], 38 JURISTISCHEARBE1TSBLATTER [JA] 687,691 (2006) [hereinafter Brugger,
Hassrede];Brugger, Ban On, supra note 110, at 13.
190. Criminal Code § 130(4).
191. Poscher, supranote 158, at 1317; Enders & Lange, supranote 160, at 107; Kristian Khl,

§ 130, No. 8b, in STRAFGESETZBUCH MIT ERLAUTERUNGEN (Karl Lackner & Kristian Kifhl eds.,
26th ed. 2007).

192. Kristian Kohl, § 130, No. 8b, in STRAFGESETZBUCH.
193. BverfG [Federal Constitutional Court], Feb. 26, 1969, 25 Entscheidungen des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 256 (holding that a call for an economic boycott ofthe press
is not protected by the right to freedom of expression and violates the freedom of the press). See
also Eberle, supra note 175, at 830-33 (discussing the case).
194. Poscher, supra note 158, at 1317-18.
195. HELLHAMMER-HAWIG, supra note 83, at 251-52.
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personal honor under Article 5(2) and accounts for the need to construe the
provision in a constitutional manner by clarifying that the claim to respect
of the victims of the Nazi regime has to be targeted. 96
' As a law protecting
personal honor under Article 5(2) it would only be a permissible limit if
the honor of the victims would be protected beyond public peace and if
every violation of dignity would also be a violation of the honor of the
victims.197
The honor of the victims is violated if the approval concerns a violation
of dignity by the National Socialist terror regime. Only approving of
conduct that does not include a violation of dignity cannot trigger another
violation of dignity. Approving of other aspects of the Nazi regime does
not fall under the new provision and its penalization would not be justified
under Article 5(2).
The legislature's intent, however, was that a violation of dignity can
also be achieved by conclusive approval, such as the glorification of
individual representatives of the Nazi regime. This might be possible if
figures of the Nazi regime who prominently organized or executed
systematic violations of dignity are revered with a discernible connection
to these acts. But the more indirectly the approval is connected to the
violation of dignity, the more important the context is to ensure that a
violation of dignity and, therefore, a violation of personal honor under
Article 5(2) is at issue.'98
Even if these constitutional requirements are met, the new provision's
impact should not be overestimated. On the one hand, sections 130(1) No.
2 and 130(3) already protect against violations of dignity.'9 9 As far as a
protection of the public peace is concerned, the new provision raises the
bar compared to the other provisions contained in section 130, requiring
not only a danger, but a certain result.2"' On the other hand, the changes in
the criminal code do not necessarily have a great effect on the law of
assembly. Although the Federal Constitutional Court has repeatedly stated
that the Criminal Law is a limit to the freedom of assembly, infringements
still have to be measured against Article 5(2).2"1 Further, while the Federal
Constitutional Court repeatedly stated that dangers for the public order

196. Kristian Kahl, § 130, No. 8b, in STRAFGESETZBUCH; Poscher, supra note 158, at 1318.
197. HELLHAMMER-HAWIG, supra note 83, at 251-52; Poscher, supra note 158, at 1318.
198. Poscher, supra note 158, at 1318.
199. Id.; Detlev Stemberg-Lieben, § 130, No. 22d, in STRAFGESETZBUCH KOMMENTAR
5(Theodor Lenckner et al. eds., 27th ed. 2006).
200. Poscher, supra note 158, at 1318; Kristian KilM, § 130, No. 8b, in STRAFGESETZBUCH;
Stemberg-Lieben, supra note 199.
201. Poscher, supra note 158, at 1318.
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generally only justify conditions, but not bans, on assemblies, this does not
mean that, vice versa, dangers for public safety always justify an assembly
ban.20 2 Rather, the requirements of proportionality must still be met so
that-under current doctrine-even if violations of public safety are
expected, placing conditions on the assembly as the less intrusive measure
comes before banning the assembly. 2 3 As in the past, these conditions
would, for example, include the prohibition of wearing uniforms or
uniform-like clothing.2 °4
Finally, and as a more practical matter, it is increasingly improbable
that right-wing extremist or Neo-Nazi group would publicly approve of,
glorify, or justify National Socialism. This is due to a change in
appearance and thinking in the right-wing extremist scene in the past
years. 215 While Neo-Nazis and right-wing extremists in the past were
freely displaying "Heim ins Reich" ideology, today's right-wing extremist
themes are more subtle, in part based on tactical calculations, in part
because a change of mind.20 6 In the past, a preferred slogan was
"Deutschlandden Deutschen, Ausldnder raus!" (Germany for Germans,
out with the foreigners!) which constituted incitement to hatred under
section 130.207 Today, however, many slogans are not punishable under
section 130, for example: "GegenArbeitslosigkeit-mehrArbeitspldtzefiir
Deutsche" (against unemployment-more jobs for Germans), or, "Fir
Meinungsfreiheit,gegen Vereinsverbote" (for freedom of speech, against
association bans). 2" As a result, it is increasingly difficult to clearly
identify the right-wing extremist agenda. Right-wing extremists and NeoNazis deliberately choose not to approve of the National Socialist regime,
or glorify or justify it at their assemblies, at least not with such clarity that
would trigger punishment for incitement to hatred and thus justify a
prohibition of the assembly as a danger to public safety.20 9
As in the past, only certain types of right-wing extremist assemblies
can be placed under conditions or can be prohibited, and the new
provisions do not spare the state from a political confrontation of right-

202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Leist, supra note 160, at 502; see also Marianne Quoirin, Markenschuhe stalt
Bomberstiefel [Designer Shoes Instead of Combat Boots], KOLNER STADT-ANZEIGER, May 16,
2007, at 2 (describing changes in the appearance of Neo-Nazis but asserting that their ideology
remains unchanged).
206. Leist, supra note 160, at 502; Bertram, supra note 160, at 1477.
207. Leist, supra note 160, at 503.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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wing extremism.21° The federal legislature, it has been asserted, hurriedly
changed section 130 to address perceived issues of the day, but these latest
changes only obscure even further not only the subject of the protection
but also, perhaps more importantly, its limits. 2 1' It is an attempt to gain
control in public discourse over certain topics; at the extreme, critics assert
that this control could be extended over any issue somehow connected to
Nazi ideology by adding new levels to the criminal prohibitions according
the needs of the day.21 2 A leading criminal law commentary raises the
question whether employing criminal law via section 15(2) was necessary,
especially with respect to the subsidiarity of criminal law in general.213
This aspect would be an argument favoring the priority of education and
discussion before turning to criminal prohibitions. 2 4 As a political matter,
irrespective of the possible unconstitutionality of the new provisions, the
federal legislature-despite its good intentions-has created new
problems. The goal to fight the media-savvy public agitation of right-wing
extremists is manifested in expansive prohibitions; meeting fundamental
criticism of the foundations of state and society primarily with criminal
prohibitions does not reinforce the persuasiveness of the constitutional
commitment to freedom, equality, and social justice. 1 5
V. DELINEATING THE SCOPE OF DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC DISCOURSE
The discussion regarding the scope ofpermissible public discourse was
shaped by a number of notable key elements. The Federal Constitutional
Court and the State Administrative Court of North Rhine-Westphalia
positioned themselves as opposites in the discussion over the role ofpublic
order and the exclusion of Neo-Nazi ideas from public discourse. The
federal legislature followed the general direction of the Federal
Constitutional Court, basing assembly bans on a threat to public safety,
and widened the scope of the criminal code. The following part will

210. Poscher, supranote 158, at 1318; see also HELLHAMMER-HAWIG, supra note 83, at 249;
Leist, supra note 160, at 503; Schoch, supra note 107, at 30; Stohrer, supra note 157, at 17
(concluding that the new section 15(2) does not contain new limiting possibilities). But see
Sternberg-Lieben, supra note 199 (pointing out that simple Holocaust denial, previously only
punishable under section 185, can now also violate section 130 if committed in a way that can
disturb the public peace).
211. Bertram, supranote 160, at 1476; see also Lembke, supra note 148, at 1083.
212. Bertram, supra note 160, at 1478.
213. Kihl, supra note 200, § 130 No. 8.
214. Id. § 130, No. 8b.
215. Enders & Lange, supra note 160, at 112.
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examine how the different approaches fit into German free speech
doctrine.
Another particularly interesting element of the discussion over the role
of the freedom of assembly in a liberal democracy and the role of freedom
of speech in the democratic process was the repeated invocation of U.S.
First Amendment doctrine on both sides of the debate. The Federal
Constitutional Court looks back on a long tradition of referencing U.S.
legal discourse in its opinions elaborating on the importance of free
speech.
A. Not Skokie: References to U.S. FirstAmendment Doctrine
Quite notably, parallels to U.S. First Amendment discourse have been
raised repeatedly within the German debate. Establishing a connection
between the current debate in Germany and U.S. First Amendment
discourse, Federal Constitutional Court Judge Hoffmann-Riem traces
parallels of the free speech development in the United States and Germany
to this day.216 Post-war German society, he asserts, largely failed to come
to grips with its past as old notions of submissiveness to state authority,
prominently exploited by the Nazi regime, were shed slowly.2" 7 A case in
point is the at-times helpless and disproportional state reaction to the
student protests of the 1960s.2 18 Judge Hoffmann-Riem traces the origins
from Berkeley in 1964 to Germany, pointing out that the student protests
soon merged with the civil rights movement and anti-Vietnam protest,
creating a free speech movement.219 The student protest of the 1960s, he
asserts, struck a nerve that extended into other societies, including
Germany.22 ° In fact, until the student protests swept across Germany in the
sixties, freedom of assembly had received little attention. 22' Together with
the later anti-nuclear-power protests, however, the movement brought
freedom of assembly to the forefront, demanding acceptance of freedom
of assembly as a liberty right and at the same time forcing the state to
protect the countervailing rights of others.22 2
Those arguing in favor of further limiting or in fact excluding the
articulation of Neo-Nazi ideas in public discourse cited, as an extreme and
obviously undesirable example, the well-known case involving a Nazi
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 108.
Id. at 2778.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 108, at 2778.
Id.
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march in Skokie, Illinois, in 1978.223 The Federal Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in Collin v. Smith224 found that, under First Amendment
standards, there was no reason to deny a Nazi march in the village of
Skokie, Illinois.225 The ordinance226 invoked by the town to prohibit the
march was invalidated because of its overbreadth.227 While content
legislation is not per se invalid, the Court stated, there are only a limited
number of established exceptions in which it is permissible, such as
obscenity, fighting words, and, under Brandenburg,the imminent danger
of a grave substantive evil. 228 The Court, however, did not find an
229
exception that would support a prohibition of the planned march.
Addressing the alleged "infliction of psychic trauma on resident holocaust
survivors and other Jewish residents," the Court agreed that "the proposed
demonstration would seriously disturb, emotionally and mentally, at least
some, and probably many of the Village's residents., 23" Nevertheless, the
Court found it "perfectly clear that a state many [sic] not make criminal
the peaceful expression of unpopular views. Likewise, mere public
intolerance or animosity cannot be the basis for abridgement of these
constitutional
freedoms. 23 ' On appeal, the Supreme Court denied
23
certiorari. 212

The relevance of the Skokie decision in this context is revealed in the
Court of Appeals' statement that "[i]t is, after all, in part the fact that our
constitutional system protects minorities unpopular at a particular time or
223. Ulrich Battis & Klaus Joachim Grigoleit, Rechtsextremistische Demonstrationenund
offentliche Ordnung-Roma locuta? [Right Wing Extremist Demonstrations and Public
Order-Roma Locuta?], 57 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRFT [NJW] 3459, 3462 (2004).
224. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1209-10 (7th Cir. 1978).
225. Id.
226. Village Ordinance No. 77-5-N-994 is
a comprehensive permit system for all parades or public assemblies of more than
50 persons. It requires permit applicants to obtain $300,000 in public liability
insurance and $50,000 in property damage insurance. One of the prerequisites for
a permit is a finding by the appropriate official(s) that the assembly will not
portray criminality, depravity or lack of virtue in, or incite violence, hatred, abuse
or hostility toward a person or group of persons by reason of reference to
religious, racial, ethnic, national or regional affiliation.
Id. at 1199.
227. Id.at 1202.
228. Id.
229. See id.at 1202-05.
230. Id. at 1205-06.
231. Village Ordinance No. 77-5-N-994, supranote 226, at 1206 (internal citation omitted).
232. See Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (denying certiorari).
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place from governmental harassment and intimidation, that distinguishes
life in this country from life under the Third Reich. 233
Invoking U.S. First Amendment doctrine, as done in several
commentaries involving the debate between the state administrative court
and the Federal Constitutional Court, demonstrates a certain level of
awareness regarding other constitutional solutions to a similar question.
The Basic Law itself was drafted and adopted to distinguish the new
Federal Republic of Germany from the Third Reich. 234 The reference to the
U.S. case within German legal discourse, though,
highlights the
235
importance of free speech in a liberal democracy.
Unsurprisingly, it has been pointed out that German courts would have
decided the Skokie case differently. 236 Battis and Grigoleit stress that the
National Socialist regime eliminated democracy in Germany and
Auschwitz became the founding myth of the Republic, posing a stark
contrast to the freedom fight that made possible the founding of the United
States. 237 These origins, they submit, shape identities, and the historically
influenced collective identity finds its way into the legal realm; in
Germany, the result was a loss of freedom. 23' The resulting limits on the
freedom of speech, however, have to be justified beyond merely pointing
to domestic criminal prohibitions in international constitutional law
discourse.239
B. Findinga Workable Balance: Social Costs andBenefits of
FreeSpeech
The Federal Constitutional Court has been engaging in a quite intricate
balancing effort, constantly stressing the benefits of free speech.
Interestingly, as will be shown, it has referred to underlying principles
familiar from U.S. First Amendment discourse validating the important
role of free speech in a liberal democracy.
1. Emphasizing the Benefits of Free Speech
The German Federal Constitutional Court has consistently emphasized
the role of free speech as a pillar of democracy, since the landmark 1958

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Collin, 578 F.2d at 1201.
See, e.g., Krotoszynksi Jr., supra note 50, at 1552-54; Eberle, supra note 175, at 800.
See, e.g., Krotoszynksi Jr., supra note 50, at 1552-54; Eberle, supra note 175, at 800.
Battis & Grigoleit, supra note 223, at 3462.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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decision in Liith,24 0 which has been characterized as "the foundational case
for interpretation of freedoms of opinion. 2 41 In Lith, the Court found the
right to free speech to be fundamental:
The fundamental right to free expression of opinion is, as the most
direct expression of human personality in society, one of the
foremost human rights of all. . .For a free democratic State system,
it is nothing other than constitutive, for it is only through it that the
constant intellectual debate, the clash of opinions, that is its vital
element is made possible ...It is in a certain sense the basis of
every freedom whatsoever, "the matrix, the indispensable condition
of nearly every other form of freedom" (Cardozo).242
The decision established the basic structure of public discourse in
presumptively protecting those types of communication that add to the
formation of public opinion. The balancing took into consideration the
significance of the public issues addressed.143 The Federal Constitutional
Court's current free speech doctrine still is within the doctrinal
arrangement established in the Liith decision .2' As Brugger points out, the
Federal Constitutional Court refers to well-known American rationales
illustrating the importance of speech, recognizing the special importance
of free speech in the formation of opinions, the importance of the free
exchange of ideas in a quest for the truth, legitimizing democracy, aiding
decision-making in personal and public matters, and eliminating the
necessity for recourse to physical violence. 245 Likewise, Professor Dieter
Grimm, a former Constitutional Court judge, stresses the special
importance of free speech articulated by the Federal Constitutional Court,

240. Lith decision, supra note 4; See also Eberle, supra note 175, at 808 (for an in-depth
discussion of the case); Claudia E.Haupt, Regulating Hate Speech: Damned If You Do and
Damned If You Don 't. Lessons Learnedfrom Comparingthe German and U.S. Approaches, 23
B.U. INT'L L.J. 299, 323-24 (2005); Krotoszynski Jr., supra note 50, at 1585-90 (for further
discussion of the case); David Weiss, Striking a Difficult Balance: Combatting the Threat ofNeoNazism in Germany while PreservinglndividualLiberties,27 VAND. J.TRANSNAT'LL. 899 (1994).
241. Eberle, supra note 175, at 827; see also Krotoszynski Jr., supra note 50, at 1585 (stating
that the Lath decision "serves as the foundation for German free speech doctrine more generally.").
242. Lith decision, supranote 4, at 208, translation quoted from Brugger, Ban On, supra note
110, at 14; see also Eberle, supra note 175, at 817.
243. Haupt, supra note 240, at 323-24.
244. Dieter Grimm, Die Meinungsfreiheit in der Rechtsprechung des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts[Freedom of Speech in the Case Law of the Federal Constitutional
Court], 48 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr [NJW] 1697, 1697 (1995).
245. Brugger, Ban On, supra note 110, at 7-8; Brugger, supra note 6, at 7-8.
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referring to French and American sources. Solving the dichotomy of
individual self-determination and collective self-government in favor of
a combined approach, the Court sees free speech both as an expression of
individual human personality within society and at the same time as a
constituting element of a free democratic social order.246
Brugger, however, rightly warns of the potentially misleading sound of
the "strong, libertarian words used by the German Federal Constitutional
Court in carving out an expansive definition of constitutionally protected
opinion.' ' 2" The fundamental issue not yet addressed in this definition is
the balancing of competing constitutional interests. 248 For a number of
reasons, the Basic Law protects the freedom of speech, but to a much more
limited degree than the First Amendment.249 As both the supreme
constitutional principle and a fundamental right, human dignity rather than
free speech is the most important constitutional value; when the two
collide, free speech usually must yield.' Seen from a U.S. perspective,
this has led to such assertions as free speech in Germany "does not get
25 2
much respect. ' 251 Instead, it "is a (very) poor cousin of human dignity.
In Germany, as in the United States, freedom of expression is a core
issue of the constitutional order and structure of society, but unlike
freedom of speech in the United States, German rights are subject to
textual, legal, cultural, and civility limits.253 Thus, Germany is committed
to free speech, albeit within carefully circumscribed limits and only to the
extent that the commitment to free speech does not conflict with other
constitutional values; most notably, human dignity and the preservation of
the democratic order.2" 4 This approach to freedom of expression, however,
should not be easily dismissed as evidently misguided or insufficiently
sensitive to the value of free speech in a democratic society.25 5 On the

246. Grimm, supra note 244, at 1698.
247. Brugger, Ban On, supra note 110, at 4-5; Brugger, Hassrede,supra note 189, at 688.
248. Brugger, Ban On, supra note 110, at 5.
249. Krotoszynski Jr., supra note 50, at 1553-54.
250. Id.See also Brugger, Ban On, supra note 110, at 5 ("The effect of this balancing is
profound, as the German Constitutional Court has never struck down any of the many criminal,
administrative, and civil prohibitions of 'constitutionally protected' hate speech in Germany.");
Wise, supra note 25, at 325.
251. Krotoszynski Jr., supra note 50, at 1552.
252. Id.
253. Eberle, supra note 175, at 798-99.
254. Krotoszynski Jr., supra note 50, at 1554. But see Whitman, supra note 188, at 1312
("This is a body of law that shows, in many of its doctrines, a numbness to free-speech concerns
that will startle any American.").
255. Krotoszynski, supra note 50, at 1554.
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contrary, Germany is oftentimes cited admiringly as an example of a
liberal democracy limiting free speech. 6 Germany and the United States
257
have weighed the social costs and benefits of free speech differently.
2. The Cost: Limits on Free Speech and Assembly
The Basic Law establishes limits on the freedom of speech and the
freedom of assembly. The Federal Constitutional Court must decide
whether freedom of expression takes priority over countervailing
constitutional interests. 258 Among the content-based exceptions from the
freedom of expression that are most relevant in this context are hate
speech, group defamation, and incitement to hatred. These exceptions can
be attributed to Germany's desire to prevent the rise of extremist groups
and ultimately the recurrence of a totalitarian regime.259
An example of such a decision in which the Federal Constitutional
Court found the countervailing interests of others to trump the interest in
free speech and assembly was the Holocaust Memorial Day decision. 26° To
recall, the First Chamber of the Federal Constitutional Court upheld the
condition to reschedule for the following day based on a threat to public
order. Although the outcome of the Holocaust Memorial Day decision may
have been welcomed by some, 26 1 the reasoning is criticized chiefly for two
reasons. First, the question is raised why conditions may be placed on the
assembly based on public order, but bans are not justified.262 The
distinctions between conditions and bans, it is asserted, are fluid.
Second, the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court is found
to be inconsistent with regard to government neutrality in restricting
freedom of expression. In the Holocaust Memorial Day case, the Court's
First Chamber of the First Senate itself based the decision on the rightwing extremist content of the assembly. 263 As a result, it remains unclear
why, based on the content of the opinions articulated, right-wing extremist
demonstrations are only found provocative on the Holocaust Memorial
Day and other symbolic days but not in general. 2' 4 A final concern raises

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
(2001).
263.

Whitman, supra note 188, at 1282; Krotoszynski Jr., supra note 50, at 1551.
Krotoszynski Jr., supra note 50, at 1554.
Brugger, supra note 6, at 9.
Eberle, supra note 175, at 806-07.
See Part IV.B.2; Holocaust Memorial Day decision, supra note 178.
ROGER, supra note 83, at 14.
Id.; Christoph Enders, Anmerkung zu I BvQ 9/01, 56 JURISTENZEnTUNG [JZ] 652, 654
Kniesel & Poscher, supra note 92, at 428; Enders, supra note 262, at 654.

264. ROGER, supra note 83, at 14.
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the question why the provocative opinions voiced during the assembly
justify any state action at all, because the First Senate of the Federal
Constitutional Court explicitly said in its "Soldiers are Murderers"
("Soldaten sind M6rder")265 decision of 1995 that intentionally polemic
and hurtful-and as such provocative-statements do enjoy Article 5(1)
protection. 66 The tension between the Soldiers are Murderers decision and
the Holocaust cases, in fact, has already been pointed out in the past.267
Federal Constitutional Court Judge Hoffmann-Riem addresses these
criticisms in explaining that the National Socialist past creates a special
status of the Holocaust Memorial Day as a day of remembrance that is
unequivocal in its symbolism, commemorating grave violations of human
rights. As such, he asserts, it is not comparable to other holidays.268
Provocative actions on this particular day would cause serious harm to the
moral sensibility of the citizens remembering the immeasurable injustice
of National Socialism and especially of the Holocaust. 269 Nonetheless,
doubts regarding the Court's treatment of its own doctrine of contentneutrality remain. In the context of the Holocaust Denial case, Professor
Brugger summarized the issue of limits on expression as follows:
intellectual honesty requires one to point out that in Holocaust
cases, the German Constitutional Court departs from its usual
doctrines concerning freedom of speech. The Court and German
jurisprudence tend not to see or discuss this divergence in terms of
what exactly the difference is, to what extent a divergence from the
usual doctrines is appropriate, and how long one should accept such
a divergence. The best explanation and, possibly, justification for
the special treatment of the Holocaust cases is the singularity of the
Holocaust in German and global history; from this singularity result
comprehensive prohibitory statutes and expansive interpretations
leading to prohibitions in the Holocaust lie cases. The moral,

265. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Oct. 10, 1995, 93
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 266, 289 (F.R.G.); see also

Krotoszynski Jr., supra note 50, at 1581-83; Brugger, Ban On, supra note 110, at 12 (discussing
the "Soldiers are Murderers" case).
266. ROGER, supra note 83, at 14-15.
267. Brugger, Ban On, supra note 110, at 18 ("This imbalance and divergence from the
Court's own free speech doctrines becomes especially striking when one compares the treatment
of the Holocaust Denial Case, where the Court took great pains to interpret a historical claim as
punishable speech, with the Soldiers-are-Murderers Case, where the Court worked hard to find a
speech-friendly interpretation.").
268. Hoffinann-Riem, supra note 26, at 262.
269. Id.
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political, and legal singularity of the Holocaust certainly stands out
in recent history, and the memory of the Holocaust has served as a
catalyst for the global concern for human rights. Yet, as terrible as
the Holocaust was, it should not distract from the necessity to allow
open and unfettered discussion in all matters of public interest,
especially when our resolve is tested by messengers or messages we
dislike-or hate.27
C. PublicDiscourseat the Fringes
Beyond the issue of limits on free speech imposed by criminal
prohibitions, two key questions remain. The first question concerns how
to react to antidemocratic, intolerant, and offensive opinions below the
level of criminally prohibited speech. In this context, it is important to
reiterate the rather limited area of controversy. It is, as previously
emphasized, the banning of demonstrations based on a threat to public
order as a preventive measure that is subject to debate. The expected acts
remain below the threshold of criminally prohibited speech. The second
question concerns the extent of criminal prohibitions on speech, such as
the widening of section 130 of the Criminal Code in the most recent
legislative changes described in Part IV. Although limits on the expression
of certain opinions may be historically justified, the question arises how
far the criminal prohibitions can be stretched while still maintaining the
necessary level ofjustification required for infringing on free speech.
1. Defending Democracy: Public Discourse and State Intervention
The state administrative court picked up an argument made in legal
literature, primarily articulated by Professor Ulrich Battis and Klaus
" ' departing from the traditional
Joachim Grigoleit,27
understanding of
"public order," suggesting that the term exceeds extralegal community
standards, such as ideas of morals and decency. Rather, it is argued, the
term signifies a basic constitutional consensus rejecting Nazi ideology. In
an attempt to implement this interpretation into practice, the state
administrative court decided that assemblies with typical Neo-Nazi

270. Brugger, Ban On,supranote 110, at 21.
271. Battis & Grigoleit, supra note 223, at 121; Ulrich Battis & Klaus Joachim Grigoleit, Die
Entwicklung des versammlungsrechtlichenEilrechtsschutzes-EineAnalyse der neuen BverfGEntscheidungen[The Development of Law of Assembly Preliminary Injunctive Relief: An Analysis
of the New Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court], 54 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT
[NJW] 2051 (2001) [hereinafter Battis & Grigoleit, Die Entwicklung]; Battis & Grigoleit, supra
note 223, at 3459.
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appearance and content such as racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia are
not merely politically unwanted or objectionable but instead violate basic
ideals essential to the value order of the Basic Law and therefore could be
prohibited as a threat to public order.272
a. Critique of the Functional Approach and Appeal to the
Memory of a Nation
The point of departure is the question whether all contributions to
public discourse and the process of democratic opinion formation, due to
their functional component, are equally legitimate.273 While the
permissibility of excluding certain political opinions from the democratic
process as being illegitimate is often regarded as the litmus-test of an open
society, Battis and Grigoleit assert that it in fact provides clues as to the
nation's stability and self-confidence. 274 Their argument primarily centers
on the possibility of actually implementing the opinions expressed in NeoNazi and right-wing extremist demonstrations.
The fundamental assumption is that, functionally, communication
rights are deemed essential for a pluralistic process of public discourse.
This being the case, they ask whether the content communicated should be
protected even if it can never actually be implemented. In the case of NeoNazi ideology, they state, actual implementation would be preempted by
several provisions of the Basic Law, especially Articles 26 and 139, and
made permanently impossible by the so-called "eternity clause"
(EwigkeitsklauseI)of Article 79(3)275 and the right to resistance of Article
20(4).276 The Basic Law-and specifically its preamble, the fundamental
rights, the eternity clause, and the concept of militant democracy-is
rightly considered a response to the experiences of the Weimar democracy
and its demise in National Socialism. 277 Precisely because of these specific

272. Ulli F.H. Rtihl, ,,6ffenltliche Ordnung" als sonderrechilicherVerbotstatbestandgegen
Neonazis im Versammlungsrecht? ["Public Order" as Specialized Prohibition Against Neo-Nazis
in the Law of Assembly?] 22 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFr FOR VERWALTUNGSRECHT [NVwZ] 531, 531
(2003); Kniesel & Poscher, supra note 92, at 427.
273. Battis & Grigoleit, supra note 223, at 122.
274. Id.
275. Translated, Article 79(3) states: "Amendments of this Constitution affecting the division
of the Federation into States [Lander], the participation on principle of the States [Lander] in
legislation, or the basic principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 are inadmissible." See
Tschentscher, supra note 23.
276. Battis & Grigoleit, Die Entwicklung, supra note 271, at 2051.
277. Battis & Grigoleit, supranote 223, at 123-24; Battis & Grigoleit, DieEntwicklung,supra
note 271, at 2051.
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historical experiences, the Basic Law limits the process of opinion
formation more than any other constitution in a western democracy.278
The rejection of National Socialism is displayed in the Basic Law's
design. Battis and Grigoleit identify one such historically motivated
provision in the peace principle of Article 26. Under Article 26(1)279 all
actions that potentially endanger the peaceful coexistence of nations and
that are conducted with the intention to disturb the peaceful coexistence of
the people are unconstitutional and subject to criminal punishment.28 °
Though this provision primarily is an outwardly- directed commitment
demanding a contribution to peace beyond the prohibition of aggression
under international law, it is also asserted to contain an introversive
component. With its clearly stated legal consequence, its material core can
be inwardly operationalized.281 In this provision, the Basic Law itself
refutes a fundamental basis of Nazi ideology. 28 2 Article 26 is blind to the
political content of opinions as it eliminates all belligerency from the
democratic process, irrespective of its political origin.283
Aside from the commitment to peace, the concept of human dignity is
the focal point of all state action, and this concept in particular counters
the National Socialist idea of ranking the community above the individual.
Nazi ideology is fundamentally incompatible with the constitutional
concept of human dignity. An ideology that is based on racism,
collectivism, and the principle of supreme leadership and unconditional
obedience is not to be legitimized in any way under the Basic Law and
permanently preempted by the "eternity clause" of Article 79(3) and the
right to resistance in Article 20(4). The special stance toward Nazi
ideology, they further assert, is displayed in the SRP decision of the
Federal Constitutional Court. The party ban was justified because the SRP
was constituted as a haven for old Nazi followers and put itself into the
tradition of the Nazi party, both in membership and party structure. This,
the Court asserted, was enough to conclude that the goal of the party and
its adherents was eliminating the free democratic basic order. 2"
Further, they claim that the denazification reference in Article 139, the
only provision in the Basic Law that explicitly mentions National
278. Battis & Grigoleit, Die Entwicklung, supra note 271, at 2051.
279. Translated, Article 26(1) states: "Acts with the potential to and undertaken with intent
to disturb the peaceful relations between nations, especially to prepare war or aggression, are
unconstitutional. They have to be made a criminal offence." See Tschentscher, supra note 23.
280. Battis & Grigoleit, Die Entwicklung, supra note 271, at 2051.
281. Battis & Grigoleit, supra note 223, at 123.
282. Battis & Grigoleit, Die Entwicklung, supra note 271, at 2051.
283. Battis & Grigoleit, supra note 223, at 124.
284. Id.
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Socialism, is significant in this context: "The legislation enacted for the
'Liberation of the German People from National Socialism and Militarism'
' This transitional
is not affected by the provisions of this Constitution."285
provision, they claim, reveals the historical awareness of the Basic Law
and provides the normative goals of the militant democracy.286 Whether
Article 139 contains an explication of the architecture of the Basic Law
and an anti-Nazi tendency that can be operationalized, they assert, seems
unclear.
They concede, however, that both text and original intent suggest a
narrowly tailored range of application. Thus, the predominant
interpretation suggests that with the conclusion of denazification, Article
139 became obsolete. Battis and Grigoleit, however, do not view this to be
a necessary conclusion, specifically pointing out that Article 139 has not
been repealed in the meantime; this would have been the logical
consequence if it were devoid of any normative content.
Until its repeal, they argue, it seems peculiar to choose an interpretation
that would render the provision devoid of any meaning. Even if the
conclusion of denazification eliminated the immediate application of
Article 139, its systematic interpretation suggests that there may well still
be some relevance to the provision. Its existence as a special provision
against right-wing activity is to be seen in context with the militant
democracy scheme.
It signifies as a transitional provision the special, historically
determined, sensitivity of the Basic Law toward Nazi ideology. If a
constitution embodies the historical memory of a nation, they assert, this
would certainly be the case in Article 139. It provides insight why the
Basic Law has limited the pluralistic process of democratic opinion
formation more extensively than any other western-style democracy.287
Thus, they conclude that the exclusion of Nazi ideology from the
democratic process of opinion formation is traceable in the constitution
and specifically embodied in the historically motivated element of militant
democracy. As a legitimate constitutional concern the principle of militant
democracy limits the freedom of expression beyond the scope of the
prohibitions of Articles 9(2) (association bans), 18 (forfeiture of individual
rights), and 21(2) (political party bans). This constitutionally required
limitation on the content of opinions, they assert, refutes the functional
argument in favor of communication rights in a democracy as made by the
Federal Constitutional Court. The public dissemination of Nazi ideology
285. Tschentscher, supra note 23.
286. Battis & Grigoleit, Die Entwicklung, supra note 271, at 2051.
287. Id.
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is not a relevant contribution to public discourse because its
implementation is constitutionally impossible. Consequently, Nazi
ideology cannot perform a democratic function; therefore, the protection
of Nazi opinions cannot be based on the significance of freedom of
expression in the democratic process.288
Applying the Basic Law's rejection of Nazi ideology to the Federal
Law of Assembly brings the term "public order" into play, signifying a
basic consensus that normatively forms the content of the term.289 Judge
Bertrams, chief judge of the administrative court, extensively restates the
positions articulated by Battis and Grigoleit, which the court picked up in
its decisions.29 ° The exclusion of Neo-Nazi ideology from democratic
public discourse, he asserts, is a constitutional interest based on the
historically founded value order of the Basic Law that justifies a limit on
" ' Although the state administrative court appears
the freedom of speech.29
to connect to the traditional understanding of the term "public order" based
on the current community standards, it views the term as fundamentally
influenced by the value order of the Basic Law. Again, looking at
provisions such as Article 26 and Article 139 leads to the conclusion that
Neo-Nazi ideology is rejected by the Basic Law and therefore precluded
from the democratic process of opinion formation. Thus, even Neo-Nazi
demonstrations articulating opinions that do not cross into the realm of
criminally prohibited speech can be prohibited. This approach can be
summed up in the hypothesis that the Basic Law contains special
provisions against
right-wing extremism that are embodied in the term
"public order,, 29 2 infusing the Federal Law of Assembly with the
constitutional rejection of fascism.
b. Underestimating the Threat
A core criticism of Judge Bertrams is that the First Chamber of the
First Senate in its interpretation of "militant democracy" fails to pay
sufficient attention to what he characterizes as a previously unthinkable
resurgence of right-wing extremist tendencies. The state administrative
court repeated this claim in several decisions. 3 The "militant democracy"
precautions of the Basic Law, namely the ban of associations and political
288. Battis & Grigoleit, supra note 223, at 125.
289. RUM, supra note 272, at 531; Kniesel & Poscher, supra note 92, at 427.
290. Bertrams, DemonstrationsfreiheitfrNeonazis?[Freedom of Assembly for Neo-Nazis?],
in PRLICHT UND VERANTWORTUNG 19, 31-32 (Bernd M. Kraske ed., 2002).
291. Bertrams, supra note 94.
292. RUh, supra note 272, at 531.
293. OVG NRW, supra note 84.
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parties, and the forfeiture of individual rights, are neither adequate nor
intended to prevent public appearances of Neo-Nazis that offend basic
social and ethical standards. To address such cases, Article 8(2) empowers
the legislature to limit the freedom of assembly. Thus, section 15 of the
Federal Law of Assembly was enacted; the provision regarding dangers to
public order is also a form of militant democracy. However, it has to be
applied in a manner that appropriately addresses contemporary reality. As
the primary guardian of the Constitution, the Federal Constitutional Court
bears a special responsibility which, according to Judge Bertrams, it has
not met with its dogmatic adherence to the 1985 Brockdorf precedent
which, in his view, dealt with an entirely different set of problems.
Continuing this jurisprudence, he insists, ignores the rise of right-wing
extremism in Germany. The phenomenon, he asserts, is trivialized if the
First Chamber of the First Senate speaks of Neo-Nazis as if they were just
another unpopular minority.2 94
Judge Bertrams concludes that, for the democratic opinion formation
process, the views of Neo-Nazis, shunned by the Basic Law, are devoid of
any significance. The protection of such views would merely serve
communicative personal freedom, but this interest is countered by the
interest in eliminating such ideas from the public discourse. These
opinions have been rejected by the Basic Law in its historical memory. In
other words, while the freedom of dissenters is a high value, it must find
its limits in the militant democracy where the attempt is made to revive the
inhuman ideas of the Third Reich. The term "public order" provides the
place to make this distinction. The threat to public order by the presence
of Neo-Nazis outweighs the infringement on their fundamental rights. As
the First Chamber of the First Senate continues to force liberal ideas,
Judge Bertrams asserts that it is unlikely the Federal Constitutional Court
will agree - thus, he calls for statutory and constitutional changes.295
2. Tolerating Intolerance
The constitution envisioned by the state administrative court would
cleanse public discourse by excluding Neo-Nazi ideology from the
democratic process of opinion formation, but as a consequence, excluded
ideologies would relocate elsewhere. Having gone underground, public
opposition to such ideologies can no longer be voiced. Such a constitution
based on the repression of undemocratic ideas perhaps might find support,
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but better reasons can be provided in favor of the approach taken in the
Basic Law.29 6
a. Internal Constitutional Limits and Public Order Revisited
Two key arguments in favor of a position of the Basic Law excluding
Nazi ideology hinge on the interpretation of Articles 26 and 139. The
interpretations offered by Battis and Grigoleit and, by extension, the state
administrative court, are not shared by a large majority of scholars and
courts. Extensive studies concerning the origins of Article 139 yield the
result that the transitional provision was included because the
Parliamentary Council (Parlamentarischer
Rat) thought the denazification
legislation to be in conflict with the new Basic Law and therefore needed
constitutional legitimization.297 The quotation marks surrounding the
phrase, "Liberation of the German People from National Socialism and
Militarism" were consciously added. The term references the
denazification legislation in place at the time, that was then known as the
"Law Concerning the Liberation of the German People from National
Socialism and Militarism." The reference denotes a finite norm complex
and is not designed for the future. 298 Thus, the vast majority of Basic Law
commentators on Article 139 agree that it is a limited provision that
references a specific body of legislation. With the conclusion of
denazification, the provision has become obsolete. 299 There is no historical
evidence that Article 139 was intended to establish an anti-fascist
constitutional principle. 00
Article 26 is one of the few provisions directly addressing
individuals.3"' However, an assembly would only violate Article 26 if
individuals were to hold an assembly capable of disturbing the peaceful
coexistence of the people. This requires a foreign policy connection as
well as a degree of intensity of the danger to peace akin to the example in
Art 26(l)(1), the preparation of an invasion. These conditions would only
exist in extremely exceptional situations.30 2
The Federal Constitutional Court refused proposals suggesting internal
constitutional limits and interpreting the term "public order" to signify a
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302. Kniesel & Poscher, supra note 92, at 426; see also Rihl, supra note 272, at 535
(discussing foreign policy implications and international law).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2008

45

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 2

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 20

basic consensus shaped by the Basic Law, although it does agree that the
Basic Law contains the rejection of National Socialism. The rejection of
National Socialism, however, is documented in the establishment of
general constitutional provisions containing guarantees against the
resurfacing of a totalitarian regime. °3 Insofar as the state administrative
court suggests that the constitutional provisions are insufficient to combat
right-wing extremism, the Federal Constitutional Court has stressed that
the state administrative court is not competent to remedy perceived
shortcomings of the Constitution. °4
b. Outlining and Preserving a Wider Scope of Democratic
Public Discourse
On the contrary, the design of the Basic Law provides a number of
arguments for keeping the scope of prohibited speech narrow, for
excluding only few opinions, and for keeping a wide scope of public
democratic discourse. The militant democracy provisions and the
protection of dignity and honor exclude the most extreme opinions. The
remainder has to be confronted and refuted in open public debate. The
Basic Law presumes that exposure to the process of public discourse will
wear down extremist opinions.30 5 The Federal Constitutional Court
consequently asserted that open discussion is the true foundation of a free
and democratic society.30 6 The process of public discourse itself, provided
that it is only concerned with the intellectual impact of opinions, is said to
have a strengthening influence on the formation of opinions in general.30 7
However, the trust the Basic Law places in the pluralistic process of
opinion formation is not unlimited as it allows state intervention,
recognizing that the demands of the democratic process and reality can
differ. When freedom of expression is abused by individuals, and
especially when such actions are taken by associations or even
institutionalized by political parties, the constitution allows the state to
intervene.30 8
The challenge of the Basic Law lies in the fact that it also grants
freedom to its enemies.30 9 The First Chamber of the First Senate states that
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citizens are not legally forced to personally share the value decisions of the
constitution. The Basic Law builds on the expectation that the citizens
accept and realize the basic value determinations of the Constitution, but
it does not force their loyalty.31° Therefore, citizens are free to challenge
basic value determinations of the Constitution, as long as they do not
endanger the rights of others. The pluralist democracy of the Basic Law
trusts in the ability of the citizens to tolerate criticism of the Constitution
" ' The Basic Law does not permit state intervention unless
and to defend it.31
and until the hostility to the Constitution is institutionalized in associations
and political parties and thus poses a real danger. In those instances, it
provides the instruments of association and political party bans, and
forfeiture of individual rights, to protect democracy. But until such
institutionalization takes place, the Basic Law envisions only political
debate with the enemies of the Constitution. Right-wing extremist and
Neo-Nazi assemblies do not amount to such an institutionalization. Thus,
in the case of a right-wing extremist assembly at the Brandenburg Gate on
May 5th, 2005, the primary expectation of the Basic Law would not be the
prohibition by way of state authority, but politically claim the location
with democratic forces.312
Federal Constitutional Court Judge Hoffmann-Riem engaged in 3an
13
analysis of some basic questions following the 2004 Senate decision.
Contrary to criticism, he, too, points out that right-wing extremism is not
merely a memory of the past.314 As already stated prior to the 2004
decision, the continuing wave of right-wing extremist demonstrations
poses a challenge for democracy. 315 While the Basic Law can defend itself
against the enemies of freedom, it also builds on pluralistic tolerance and
limits itself in the interest of liberal democracy and the rule of law;
therefore, the fundamental rights also apply to those who fight the
normative ideal of the Basic Law.3 16 The Basic Law extends civil rights
and liberties to all and cannot deny them to those who oppose its
fundamental values. It can only infringe on their rights if the rights of
others are threatened.31 7
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As desirable as it might seem to stifle right-wing extremist tendencies
before they grow, the neutrality of the state has to be maintained. An
assembly cannot be prohibited merely because of expected right-wing
extremism without criminally relevant propaganda."' Right-wing
extremist assemblies can only be prohibited as a preventive measure when
the organizers indicate that criminally prohibited opinions will be voiced.
Certainly, if preventive measures are impossible, it becomes even more
important to intervene if criminal acts are, in fact, committed. Right-wing
extremist ideology must be met with determination. Right-wing extremist
assemblies therefore cannot be banned as a preventive measure solely
based on the expected content of opinions to be articulated." 9
With regard to the stance taken by the state administrative court, it has
been pointed out that if, based on historical experiences, the notion arises
that engaging Neo-Nazism and right-wing extremism is unreasonable, a
serious constitutional debate must follow.320 Should the negative historical
imprint on German collective identity gain such a dynamic that Neo-Nazi
opinions-as opposed to all other political opinions-are no longer
tolerable in public discourse, the place in which to anchor and document
this special historical imprint on German political identity would not be
yet another change to the Federal Law of Assembly or its interpretation. 2 '
While these arguments support a wider scope of public democratic
discourse than the one outlined by the state administrative court, the latest
legislative activities, particularly the change to section 130 of the Criminal
Code, suggest a different direction. Instead of political engagement with
the enemies of democracy, the state is further limiting political speech.
With respect to the most recent changes in the Criminal Code, there have
been calls for the legislature to change its course; more than sixty years
after the end of the "Third Reich," it is argued, it is time to leave the longpursued special path and to return to the "normal" standards of a liberal
democracy. 2 If one follows the argument that section 130 is primarily
historically justified, it is argued that sixty years after the end of National
Socialism it might carefully be considered that at some point in time,
Germany might slowly leave its special path. The legislative activities,
however, reveal the opposite. 23 Thus, it has been asserted that the path the
Basic Law paved to deal with enemies of the constitution below the
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threshold of24 militant democracy-style protective measures has been
abandoned.
One important aspect has to be emphasized. The realization of a
peaceful civil society requires a lively and energetic contribution of
citizens and politicians alike; not least, it requires a certain amount of
monetary expense. A particularly alarming example cited the
unwillingness of established democratic parties to financially contribute
to a counter-demonstration opposing an NPD assembly.325 The costs,
however, are far less than the loss of freedom that would be suffered if the
principle of equal freedom for all was abandoned.3 26 This connects to the
danger of complacency of the democratic polity. Opposing antidemocratic
tendencies requires the population to maintain a vigilant stance. But
democratic vigilance, it has been pointed out, requires profound
democratic education.327
VI. CONCLUSION

Antidemocratic ideas create a dilemma for democratic states:
suppression of such ideologies offends the democratic principle while at
the same time their presence threatens the very system institutionalizing
the principle of tolerance itself.3 28 Even though the state administrative
court's stance was one of futile defiance, a positive aspect to be taken from
this debate is that it renewed the discussion in German legal scholarship
and among the courts regarding the extent to which freedom of speech is
protected. The 2004 Senate decision was another step in the debate,
although it did not resolve all underlying doctrinal questions.329
While there is no debate on the possibility to prohibit an assembly
based on a threat to public safety if the proportionality of the measure is
ensured, there is still room for debate below the level of criminally
prohibited speech. The State Administrative Court of North RhineWestphalia certainly wants to take a stand against Neo-Nazis, but limiting
the scope of democratic public discourse, even if antidemocratic ideas are
articulated, is not productive. Demonstrating the strength of democracy by
allowing its enemies to march, however, achieves the exposure of
antidemocratic ideas to democratic discourse. Letting the enemies of
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democracy march certainly requires a high level of vigilance, and the
authorities have to intervene immediately if a threat to public safety
occurs.
Dislike of certain persons and disapproval of their goals cannot guide
state actions, and Neo-Nazis, too, can claim their civil rights and
liberties.33 Protecting the democratic order of the Basic Law can involve
protecting the freedom of persons who display fundamentally
objectionable ideas. Judge Hoffmann-Riem portrays tolerance toward the
intolerant as a hallmark of a free democratic state. In more than fifty years,
the state has proven strong enough to extend its freedom guarantees to all
citizens, regardless of their opinion of the state. Finally, Judge HoffmannRiem points out that times can change, and anyone can potentially be in
a position requiring the protection of fundamental rights-protecting the
fundamental rights of enemies of freedom at the same time protects the
fundamental rights of those who fight for them.33 ' As a philosophical
matter liberal states generally value the protection of speech, but, perhaps
somewhat inconveniently, in practice it is usually only offensive speech
that requires protection.332
Democratic public discourse extends to the fringes, but under German
free speech doctrine ends where the rights of others are endangered. The
decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court, both by its First Chamber
and the Senate, show that public discourse in Germany will be found
permissible unless criminal prohibitions, reflecting appropriate historically
motivated policy choices in line with Germany's post-war selfunderstanding and carried by the vast majority of German citizens, are
violated. Prohibiting certain types of speech is not self-serving, and
therefore, merely referencing the criminal prohibitions is not a genuine
justification. Making a historically motivated policy choice, however,
constitutes such a justification. At the same time, speech falling short of
criminally prohibited speech is to be permitted and criminal prohibitions
are to be kept to a minimum. Otherwise, this valid justification would be
undermined.
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